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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The interaction between consumers and firms is influenced by multiple informa-
tion asymmetries. Most consumers do not know everything there is to know about
all the various sellers that provide them with their needs and wants, but they
certainly have the means-and occasionally the urge-to obtain some of this infor-
mation. Moreover, the cost of obtaining this information differs from consumer
to consumer. This is partly the result of inherent differences between individuals
and partly caused by firm characteristics and strategies. Some consumers find
it relatively costless to learn the pertinent facts about firms of interest. These
consumers might not value the time spent on gathering information, they might
obtain this information freely from their friends, or they might enjoy the informa-
tion gathering process (i.e., shopping). Other consumers obtain information at a
cost. Such consumers may find their time too precious to spend searching around,
either because they are very wealthy and put a high premium on their time or
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because they are too poor and find it difficult to search.
In their struggle for consumer attention, firms also influence the cost of obtain-
ing information about themselves. Consumers are daily bombarded with adver-
tisements from a medley of sources that range from conventional media such as
TV, radio, newspaper, and internet advertisement to movie product placements
and human billboards. Some of these advertisements are informative—they reveal
prices, product characteristics, or firm locations. Many are not. Much of advertis-
ing is used to convince consumers that they want to purchase the good and that
they are better off purchasing it from the firm advertising. Nor are traditional
advertisements the only way to grab, and more importantly keep, consumer atten-
tion. Firms can lure consumers in and hold on to them using pricing policies such
as sales, price-matching or beating guarantees, or buy-now discounts; by offering
better in-store or post purchase customer service; by having good refund policies
and product warranties; or simply by being located closer to their target consumer.
Consumers are not the only ones who may enter the market lacking information
about a particular firm. This may be equally true for that firm’s rivals. This
particular information asymmetry, along with a standard inability to engage in
first degree price discrimination, drives many firm price and non-price policies.
For instance, because firms cannot predict each other’s prices, in the presence of
consumer heterogeneity, they run sales of varying magnitudes even when selling
the exact same good. The standard Bertrand outcome may be avoided as long
as some consumers don’t shop around (and enter the first firm they search, say a
local store), but monopoly pricing does not prevail as long as high prices induce
a proportion of consumers to search and firms understand that they can undercut
each other. Thus, firms have to strike a pricing balance by determining how much
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they want to profit by extracting surplus from non-searching consumers and how
much they want to improve their probability of capturing searching consumers
with lower prices. In the face of competition, firms have to make similar decisions
about advertising and other strategies. The choices that firms make in the presence
of incomplete information may be very different from those they make when all
firms know everything about all other firms.
This thesis explores how various firm policies and characteristics influence con-
sumer shopping behavior in the presence of information asymmetries and in turn,
how shopping behavior effects firm price and non-price policy. In the first essay
(Chapter 2), I explore how price-matching guarantees can lead to shopping be-
havior that is profoundly different from that in a model without such guarantees.
In the second essay (Chapter 3), jointly authored with Carmen Astorne-Figari,
we explore asymmetries in firm pricing that stem from differences in consumer
characteristics such as proximity to a particular firm. In the third essay (Chapter
4), also jointly authored with Carmen Astorne-Figari, we take a fundamentally
different view of consumer reactions to advertising from those commonly used in
the theory literature to explore the relationship between advertising and price,
consumer welfare, and firm profitability. Work on the second and third essays
contains equal theoretical contributions by both co-authors.
1.2 Essay 1: Price-Matching
A price-matching guarantee is a promise by one firm to set its price for a good
to that of a rival firm upon consumer request (and in most cases, along with
evidence of the rival’s price). The standard theoretical view of this firm strat-
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egy, first established by Hay (1982) and then Salop (1986), is that it is a way
to facilitate anti-competitive behavior. Price-matching guarantees are posited
to create tacit price collusion between firms by eroding firm incentives to lower
prices. The anti-competitive view received further attention in Belton (1987),
Png and Hirshleifer (1987), Doyle (1988), Zhang (1995), and Hviid and Shaffer
(1999), and prompted Edlin (1997) to call for an end to price-matching guaran-
tees on antitrust grounds. Proponents of the anti-competitive view argue that
price-matching guarantees make firms hesitant to lower prices because of fear of
immediate retaliation by matching firms, they allow firms to engage in welfare
reducing price-discrimination between “informed” and “uninformed” consumers,
and they promote minimum product differentiation.
The anti-competitive view contrasts the typical consumer’s impression of price-
matching guarantees as signals of lower prices (Jain and Srivastava, 2000; Srivas-
tava and Lurie, 2001). This observation has led many researchers to investigate
potential pro-competitive effects of price-matching. One argument in favor of
price-matching guarantees is that the price discrimination that stems from con-
sumer heterogeneity can actually increase consumer welfare if enough consumers
pay lower prices (Corts, 1996; Chen et al., 2001). An alternative argument is that
when firms are also heterogeneous, firms can use price-matching to signal prices and
consumers can take advantage of these signals either because the signals send them
to the lower pricing firm or because they allow them to apply price-matching guar-
antees at higher pricing firms (Moorthy and Winter, 2006; Moorthy and Zhang,
2006).
In this essay I extend the literature on price-matching by showing that price-
matching has several additional, previously unexplored effects on consumer shop-
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ping behavior. To do so, I endogenize consumer price search behavior ala Stahl
(1989) and show that there are several changes in the way consumers shop when
price-matching guarantees are available. Contrary to Stahl, consumers who have
no cost of search may no longer purchase from the firm listing the lowest price
because they can obtain this price elsewhere by using a price-matching guarantee.
This behavior decreases firms’ ability to capture consumers by running bigger sales,
therefore encouraging them to raise prices. Price-matching also diminishes search
activity in the sense that it makes consumers who do have a cost of search require
higher price observations to induce them to search beyond the first firm. This con-
trasts the previous literature, which either does not allow “uninformed” consumers
to search or posits that price-matching will somehow encourage them to search. As
a result, firms have further impetus to raise prices. A third price increasing effect
of price-matching guarantees is the prevalence of asymmetric equilibria where the
proportion of consumers that begin their search in each firm is different. Using
numerical analysis, I find that the price increasing effects of price-matching guar-
antees rise when more consumers make use of these guarantees and also in the
amount of asymmetry that prevails in equilibrium. While this essay supports the
price-increasing outcome of the standard view of price-matching, contrary to the
previous literature, the underlying driver of increases in price is the change in con-
sumer incentives regarding where to shop and whether or not to sample additional
firms.
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1.3 Essay 2: Asymmetric Search
Many economists have asked why price dispersion occurs in markets for homoge-
neous goods. A popular explanation suggests that consumers vary in the amount
of information they possess about firm prices (Varian, 1980) or in the cost of ob-
taining that information (Stahl 1989; 1996; Janssen et al. 2005). This gives firms
contrasting pricing motives: keep prices high to extract profit from consumers
who remain relatively uninformed about prices in rival firms, lower them to at-
tract consumers who are relatively informed. As a result, firms play mixed pricing
strategies where they run sales of different magnitudes.
Because firms are frequently assumed to be homogeneous and the consumer
search order is assumed to be random, in equilibrium, all firms choose prices from
the same price distribution. However, in many real world market scenarios, dif-
ferent firms carrying the same products expect to encounter different types and
numbers of consumers. Arbatskaya (2007) studies such a situation where con-
sumers with different search costs all sample prices in the same order. Consumers
keep searching as long as their cost is lower than the price difference between the
current and subsequent firm. Armstrong et al. (2009) set up a model where all
consumers prefer to search a prominent firm first, which henceforth has a different
price from all remaining firms. However, in both papers, because all consumers
have the same search order, the equilibrium is in pure strategies: that is, firms
in a particular place in the search order always have a higher or lower price than
other firms. Yet, if we compare two stores, say a supermarket and convenience
store, which might expect to be visited by different proportions of different types
of consumers, although one might expect the latter to have higher prices most of
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the time, it probably does not have higher prices all of the time. In this essay, we
are able to study such a situation by supposing that some consumers can sample
price freely at their local firm, but must pay for an additional sample elsewhere
and that the proportions of local consumers in different firms are different.
In equilibrium, we find that the firm with more local consumers has higher
prices on average and runs fewer sales, but that its sales can be just as large as
those of the firm with fewer local consumers. This result generalizes Narasimhan’s
(1988) model where consumers are either fully informed or only informed of the
price at one firm. However, we find that the highest price firms are willing to
charge may be significantly lower than the consumer valuation for the good when
the cost of sampling an additional firm is sufficiently small. An additional finding
of note is that although average prices fall when the proportion of consumers who
sample prices freely rises, the firm with more locals may run fewer sales. This
turns out to have important implications for advertising policy to lower-income
consumers, particularly with regard to traditional advertising using informative
circulars.
1.4 Essay 3: Advertising
The theoretical study of advertising has been dominated by three views: the per-
suasive, the informative, and the complementary (Bagwell, 2007). The initial
characterization of advertising conformed to the persuasive view, under which ad-
vertising alters consumers’ valuations for advertised goods and creates product
differentiation in consumers’ minds, even when no meaningful differentiation ex-
ists (Braithwaite, 1928; Kaldor, 1950). As such, advertising was seen as harmful to
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consumers. The Chicago School took issue with the view, instead suggesting that
advertisements serve to inform consumers—e.g., sellers’ advertising messages in-
form buyers of their price and location (Stigler, 1961; Telser, 1964; Butters, 1977;
Grossman and Shapiro, 1984; Robert and Stahl, 1993). Furthermore, Chicago
economists argued that advertising should not change tastes, setting the basis for
the complementary view, which states that advertising enters a stable utility func-
tion as a complement to the good advertised (Stigler and Becker, 1977; Becker and
Murphy, 1993).
In this paper, we offer a new characterization of advertising. Following Bull-
more (1999) and Ehrenberg et al. (2002), we view advertising as a form of
publicity—that is, we believe that an important role of advertising is to get con-
sumers to notice a product or brand in the first place and to retain it in memory
during a purchasing situation. In the face of competitive clutter, consumers are
likely to get confused about which brand a particular ad refers to (Keller, 1987;
Burke and Srull 1988; Kent, 1993; Kent and Allen, 1993, 1994; Kumar and Kr-
ishnan, 2004). This gives advertising a “public good” quality which expands the
market, along with its “brand building” effect. We analyze these two effects to
study the relationship between advertising and economic outcomes. The equilib-
rium in our model is characterized by price dispersion. We find that in equilibrium,
the level of market expanding advertising does not depend on price. This occurs
because market expansion increases the number of consumers purchasing a prod-
uct, but does not improve a firm’s chances of making a sale to any particular
consumer. The relationship between advertising which makes consumers more
likely to seek out a particular brand and price is more complicated. Depending
on the ratio of advertising cost to the maximum profit a firm can obtain from an
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additional consumer, all firms may engage in wasteful advertising, no firm might
advertise, or firms may randomize between the two.
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Chapter 2
Price-Matching in a Sequential
Search Duopoly
2.1 Introduction
Currently, price-matching guarantees can be found in a large number of markets,
including consumer electronics, office supplies, kitchen utensils, automobile acces-
sories, medicine, and hotels, among many others. These guarantees typically come
in the form of an offer by a firm to lower its price to that of a cheaper rival selling
an identical good for consumers who can offer proof of the rival’s price. The effect
that these guarantees have on prices is frequently debated in the economics and
marketing literature. On one hand, the guarantees may signal a firm’s competi-
tiveness. For instance, Walmart’s price-matching policy states, “Our goal is always
to be the low price leader in every community where we operate,” suggesting the
company is willing to lower its prices below those of its competitors.1 On the other
1“Walmartstores.com: Price matching.” Walmartstores.com. January 16, 2008. Retrieved
September 26, 2010. 〈http://walmartstores.com/7659.aspx〉.
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hand, price-matching guarantees are purported to foster price-increasing tacit col-
lusion and price discrimination that allow firms to perpetually list high prices.
Indeed, Walmart’s policy seems to reinforce this view as well, stating, “there’s no
need for ’special sales’.”2
The idea that price-matching guarantees could be anti-competitive was first
raised by Hay (1982) and then Salop (1986), who suggest that these guarantees
allow firms to immediately retaliate against rival price cuts without actually list-
ing lower prices or expending resources to learn about competitor prices. This
can lead to tacit collusion in a non-cooperative equilibrium by removing firms’ in-
centives to cut prices. Subsequently, this idea was formalized in multiple settings:
Bertrand oligopoly (Doyle 1988), differentiated products Stackelberg duopoly (Bel-
ton 1987), Hotelling duopoly (Zhang 1995), and differentiated products Bertrand
duopoly where consumers incur hassle costs of applying price-matching guarantees
(Hviid and Shaffer 1999). A parallel line of reasoning posits that price-matching
guarantees allow firms to price discriminate between consumers with limited price
information and those who are informed about multiple price quotes. For exam-
ple, Png and Hirshleifer (1987) show that price-matching guarantees allow firms to
keep list prices high to extract welfare from uninformed consumers, while attract-
ing informed consumers by offering to price-match the rival firm when it offers a
lower price.
A growing body of research argues that price-matching guarantees also have
2Empirically, price-matching has been argued as being consistent with both, lower prices
(Moorthy and Winter 2006, Moorthy and Zhang 2006) and with higher prices (Hess and Gerstner
1991, Arbatskaya et al. 2006). More recently, laboratory market simulations have supported the
latter view (see, for instance Fatas and Manez 2007), but show that price increases can be
mitigated by firms’ cost asymmetries (Mago and Pate 2009) or by hassle costs that consumers
may face in exercising price-matching guarantees (Dugar and Sorensen 2006).
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pro-competitive effects. Corts (1996) and Chen et al. (2001) use models with
heterogeneous consumers to show that when firms use price-matching guarantees
to price discriminate, some or all consumers may end up paying lower prices and
consumer welfare can increase. Using surveys of consumers, Jain and Srivastava
(2000) and Srivastava and Lurie (2001) argue that consumers perceive stores that
offer price-matching guarantees to have lower prices. Moorthy and Winter (2006)
and Moorthy and Zhang (2006) build on this argument by constructing models of
price-matching with respectively, horizontal and vertical firm differentiation, where
consumers consider their location or service preferences when choosing where to
purchase and consumers who are uninformed about prices use price-matching as a
signal that influences their price expectation for a particular firm. They show that
when the difference in production costs between the two firms is sufficiently large
and the uninformed population is sufficiently small, price-matching guarantees
can be used to signal a low price and consumer welfare improves for a range of
parameters.
While each of the aforementioned models has shown that price-matching can
alter firm pricing behavior, as Moorthy and Winter point out, another allocative
effect of price-matching is its impact on consumers’ incentive to invest in infor-
mation about prices (i.e., to price shop). Price-matching models of tacit collusion
ignore this effect by assuming that all consumers are perfectly informed about firm
pricing decisions. Consequently, in such models, either price-matching leads to a
symmetric monopolistic outcome, something which is rarely observed in reality,
or in order to avoid the monopoly result, the authors assume that products are
somehow differentiated. In the latter case, product differentiation is interpreted as
differences in firm locations since firms only price-match identical products. But
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this interpretation is suspect because price-matching guarantees generally require
physical evidence of another firm’s price, which should entail a cost to find for at
least some subset of consumers. Most remaining models assume that consumers
are heterogeneous with respect to the amount of price information that they pos-
sess. However, differences in price information are exogenously imposed: some
consumers observe every price at no cost, while others stop at the first firm they
sample with no regard to optimal shopping behavior.3
This paper departs from the previous literature by endogenizing the incentive
to acquire price information and allowing consumers to engage in optimal price
search. When the acquisition of price information is endogenous, consumers who
would search both firms and make a purchase from the firm listing the lowest price
in the absence of price-matching might use a price-matching guarantee to purchase
from a firm listing a higher price. This contrasts recent papers like Chen et al.
(2001) and Janssen and Parakhonyak (2009), where the effects of price-matching
stem from an exogenously imposed increase in search activity by consumers who
remain relatively uninformed in the absence of price-matching guarantees. Rather,
the result is opposite: price-matching discourages such consumers from engaging
in search activity instead of encouraging it. As a consequence, unlike in the papers
above, consumers who use price-matching guarantees never expect them to yield
lower prices. The purchasing behavior in this paper is more sensible because it
3Two exceptions include Lin (1988) and Janssen and Parakhonyak (2009). Lin sets up a
highly stylized model where consumers can sample one or two firms without recall, but additional
samples are infinitely costly. He concludes that firms use price-matching guarantees to set higher
prices by encouraging consumers to engage in increasingly costly search activity. Janssen and
Parakhonyak analyze an optimal search model where consumers only learn if a firm offers a price-
matching guarantee after they sample it. For price-matching to have any effect, they require an
exogenous proportion of costly searchers to freely learn the rival firm’s price after making a
purchase at the first firm.
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tells us that the users of price-matching guarantees are consumers with a lower
opportunity cost of using their time. In reality, price-matching can be a time
consuming activity which only price conscious consumers engage in.
As in the literature which treats price-matching as a form of tacit collusion,
price-matching in this paper unambiguously raises prices. However, by endoge-
nizing consumer search, we avoid the monopoly outcome without assuming that
products are differentiated. Moreover, the underlying mechanism behind price in-
creases is very different. Firms do not directly respond to their competitors’ price-
matching guarantees. Rather, they are reacting to changes in consumer search
behavior brought about by price-matching guarantees.
To endogenize the acquisition of price information within a model of price-
match, we extend a duopoly version of Stahl’s 1989 model of sequential consumer
search by giving firms the option to offer price-matching guarantees before they
set their prices for a homogenous good. There are two types of consumers in the
market: those who face no opportunity cost of searching (referred to as shoppers)
and those who do (non-shoppers). Consumers sample prices sequentially. When
doing so, a consumer with a price at hand continues searching only as long as
the marginal benefit of doing so is higher than the marginal cost. In equilibrium,
firms randomize over lower prices to attract shoppers, who always search both
firms and obtain the lower price, and over higher prices to realize greater profits
from non-shoppers, who must consider how likely they are to get a low enough
price to justify an additional search.
In this framework, price-matching guarantees bring about three price-increasing
changes in consumer search behavior. First, because shoppers freely observe every
price, in Stahl’s original model, the firm with the lowest listed price captures all of
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them. However, when firms price-match, some shoppers can use a price-matching
guarantee to obtain the lowest price at a firm listing a higher price. This option
diminishes firms’ incentive to lower prices because the lowest listed price no longer
guarantees a firm will capture all shoppers. As the number of shoppers that make
use of price-matching guarantees grows, the incentive to lower prices diminishes,
leading to higher profits for firms and lower welfare for consumers. Since all con-
sumers act rationally in this model, non-shoppers understand this price-increasing
effect and anticipate higher prices in firms they have not sampled. Hence, a sec-
ond price increasing effect arises from non-shoppers’ willingness to pay a higher
maximal price at the firm where they begin their search rather than pay the search
cost to sample another firm’s price.
A third consequence of price-matching guarantees is a multitude of asymmet-
ric equilibria where otherwise homogenous firms have different pricing strategies.
These equilibria fall into two categories: (i) those where the equilibrium outcome
is such that both firms price-match, but firms focus on serving different consumer
segments, and (ii) those where only one firm matches. When both firms offer price-
matching guarantees, shoppers can obtain the lowest price wherever they make a
purchase. As a result, in equilibrium more shoppers may buy from one firm than
the other. In this case, the other firm plays a pricing strategy that attracts a larger
proportion of non-shoppers, resulting in an equilibrium outcome where one firm
serves more non-shoppers while the other expects to sell to more shoppers. In an
outcome where only one firm offers price-matching guarantees, more non-shoppers
frequent the firm without a guarantee and the other firm uses price-matching to
capture more shoppers in equilibrium. As the disparity in the proportion of each
consumer segment that firms serve grows, firm profits increase at the expense of
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consumers. The higher the proportion of non-shoppers a firm serves, the more
profit it will lose from these “captive” consumers by lowering its price to attract
shoppers, and the less inclined it is to do so. The upward shift in this firm’s price
distribution implies that the firm that focuses on catering to shoppers does not
need to lower prices as much to expect to capture the same proportion of them
and its price distribution shifts upward as well. Hence, the more asymmetry that
price-matching entails, the greater the welfare loss to consumers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the
model and equilibrium concept. Section 2.3 characterizes consumer search behav-
ior. Section 2.4 solves for equilibrium when price-matching is imposed exogenously.
Section 2.5 uses a numerical analysis to characterize the complete market equilib-
rium. Section 2.6 provides additional intuition and discusses potential extensions.
Section 2.7 concludes. Section 2.8 is an appendix containing formal proofs.
2.2 Model and Equilibrium
With the exception of our framework for the acquisition of price information, our
modeling assumptions are standard in the price-matching literature. Two firms,
labeled 1 and 2, sell a homogenous good. Firms face no capacity constraints and
have an identical constant cost of 0 of producing one unit of the good.4 There
is a unit mass of almost identical consumers with inelastic (unit) demand and
valuation v > 0 for the good.
Consumers are a priori uninformed about prices, but they can learn about
them through search. Following Stahl (1989), we assume that a proportion µ ∈
4The price of the good can be viewed as a price cost margin.
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(0, 1) of the consumers have 0 search cost. These consumers are viewed as having
no opportunity cost of time and are henceforth referred to as shoppers.5 The
remaining 1 − µ consumers, called non-shoppers, pay search cost c ∈ (0, v) for
each firm they visit with the exception of the first. Search is sequential with costless
second visits. After observing the price at the first firm for free, consumers decide
whether or not to search the next one or to exit the market altogether. Consumers
who have visited both firms may freely choose the cheapest price observed.6
In a model without price-matching, shoppers freely sample both prices and
always buy from the firm with the lower listed price, but in a model where firms
publically announce their intent to offer a price-matching guarantee, shoppers can
obtain the low price elsewhere. We assume that when the two firms offer different
prices, θS ∈ [0, 1] shoppers will ignore price-matching guarantees and always pur-
chase from the firm with the lower listed price. The remaining 1− θS will invoke
a price-matching guarantee at the last firm they stopped in when one is available
and necessary to obtain the lower price there and purchase from the firm with the
lower listed price otherwise. In this setup, when one firm lists the lower price, while
the other offers a price-matching guarantee, shoppers are indifferent between firms.
Parameter θS allows us to subsume the full range of possible shopper behaviors.
7
5Interpretations of shoppers in the literature are as individuals who read sales ads (Varian
1980), as consumers who derive enjoyment from shopping (Stahl 1989), as a coalition of consumers
who freely share their search information (Stahl 1996), and as users of search engines (Janssen
and Non 2008).
6One way to interpret the search cost is as a cost of finding out the price in a particular firm
for the first time rather than as the cost of traveling there. Janssen and Parakhonyak (2010)
show that when second visits are costly in a model of sequential price search, firms nevertheless
use pricing strategies that are identical to the perfect recall case.
7θS may be interpreted as the proportion of shoppers who do not pay attention to price-match
announcements or alternatively, as the proportion who face a positive hassle cost of using the
guarantee, in which case, the shoppers prefer to purchase from the firm listing the lower price.
Note, however, that both interpretations make the innocuous assumption that the remaining
1− θS shoppers always employ a price-matching guarantee whenever they can.
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Thus, we can imagine that shoppers use a price-matching guarantee not because
it gives them a lower price than what they could get otherwise, but because they
have an unmodeled intrinsic preference for a particular firm and the guarantee
accords them the lowest price at that firm.
Firms and consumers play the following two-stage game. In the first stage,
each firm simultaneously decides whether to adopt a price-matching guarantee. A
firm that has adopted such a guarantee pre-commits itself to sell the good at the
minimum listed price to consumers who have observed both prices and are hence
able to invoke the guarantee. We view the costs of informing consumers of the
decision to price-match as sunk. In the second stage, each firm’s price-matching
decision is known to all agents in the model. Firms then simultaneously choose
prices, taking into consideration their beliefs about rival firm strategies as well as
consumer search behavior. A pricing strategy consists of a price distribution Fi,
where Fi (p) represents the probability that firm i offers a price no higher than p.
We denote the lower bound and upper bound of the support of the distribution for
firm i as p
i
and p¯i, respectively. After prices have been realized, consumers choose
optimal search strategies given their beliefs about each Fi. Parameters v, c, µ, and
θS, as well as the rationality of all agents in the model are commonly known.
The equilibrium concept used is Sequential Equilibrium. In this context, con-
sumers who observe out of equilibrium prices believe that they are coming from
a mixed strategy that puts a small weight on prices off the equilibrium path in
such a way that optimal search behavior would dictate the same decision as if
the unsampled firm did play its equilibrium strategy. Intuitively, we can think
of consumers who observe an off-equilibrium price at the first firm they sample
as treating such deviations as mistakes when forming beliefs about the remaining
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firm’s strategy. That is, consumers believe that unsampled firms play their equi-
librium strategies at all information sets. In equilibrium, because consumers are
homogenous in all respects except for the cost of search, consumers who have no
price information will either all prefer to begin their search at a particular firm
or they will be indifferent between which firm to sample first. In this paper, we
focus on equilibria where consumers who have no price information are indiffer-
ent between which firm to sample first and a positive fraction of both consumer
types samples each firm first. As a result, in equilibrium, a fraction βS ∈ (0, 1) of
shoppers and a fraction βN ∈ (0, 1) of non-shoppers begin their search at firm 1,
while the remaining consumers begin their search at firm 2, where βS and βN are
functions of Fi and the exogenous parameters.
8
2.3 Consumer search behavior
It is instructive to first discuss consumer search behavior. Since we focus on
equilibria where all consumers are indifferent regarding which firm to sample first
(regardless of firm price-matching decisions), it suffices to consider each consumer’s
decision regarding whether or not to search the second firm. Consumers who have
no costs of search will search both firms before making their purchase decision.
Those consumers with search cost c will search the second firm only if the marginal
expected benefit of continued search exceeds the cost. Thus, the optimal search
rule is for a non-shopper who has freely observed the price at firm j to continue
8In an equilibrium where consumers who have no price information strictly prefer to begin
search at a particular firm (if one exists) either βS or βN equals 0 or 1. It can be shown that
for a small range of parameter values, there exists an equilibrium where only one firm offers a
price-matching guarantee on the equilibrium path and all non-shoppers prefer to begin searching
the non-matching firm first.
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search if and only if the observed price is higher than a reservation price, ri, which
makes him indifferent between searching firm i and stopping. This reservation
price is then defined as the solution to∫ ri
p
i
(ri − p)dFi(p) = c (2.1)
Note that reservation price ri corresponds to consumers who begin their search
at firm j and vice versa because consumers who begin at firm j must decide whether
or not to search firm i based on the price they observed at firm j and their beliefs
about firm i’s pricing strategy. After integration by parts, Equation (2.1) becomes∫ ri
p
i
Fi(p)dp = c (2.2)
A price below ri does not necessarily entail a purchase. In particular, if ri > v,
consumers who observe a price between ri and v in firm j will not make a purchase,
but they will also not proceed to firm i.
2.4 Firm pricing strategies
We begin by deriving the equilibria in the four possible subgames that follow
firms’ price-matching decisions: the subgame where neither firm price-matches,
the subgame where both firms price-match, and the two subgames where only one
firm matches. In Section 2.5 we will endogenize the price-matching decisions to
analyze the complete equilibrium of the game.
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2.4.1 Neither firm price-matches
Following Stahl (1989), Astorne-Figari and Yankelevich (2010) show that in the
subgame without matching, there is a unique Sequential Equilibrium where both
firms distribute prices over support [(1− µ) p¯/(1 + µ), p¯] with distribution F (p) =
[1 + µ− (1− µ) p¯/p]/(2µ), where p¯ = min {v, r∗} and r∗, the equilibrium reserva-
tion price, is defined as
r∗ =
r (µ, c) = c
(
1− 1−µ
2µ
ln 1+µ
1−µ
)−1
if r (µ, c) ≤ v
∞ otherwise
(2.3)
In the model presented here, this equilibrium is unique up to βS. Since there
are no mass points in equilibrium, regardless of where shoppers search first, they
will always purchase from the firm with the lower listed price. As a result, the
equilibrium outcome is the same for all βS ∈ [0, 1] when firms do not offer price-
matching guarantees. Symmetry tells us that βN = 1/2.
9 Thus, in equilibrium,
half the non-shoppers sample each firm first and since p¯ = min {v, r∗}, they
purchase from the first firm sampled without observing the price of the other firm.
As a result, firms randomize over lower prices to attract shoppers, and over higher
prices to extract greater profits from captive non-shoppers.
9Astorne-Figari and Yankelevich (2010) set βN exogenously, whereas here, non-shoppers
randomly choose which firm to sample first. However, from their paper, we know that when
βN 6= 1/2 , the price distribution of the firm that more non-shoppers choose to sample first, first
order stochastically dominates that of its rival. Since non-shoppers have correct beliefs about firm
price distributions and because these distributions are bounded from above by min {v, r∗1 , r∗2},
this would imply that all non-shoppers would prefer to sample the firm with the dominated
distribution first, a contradiction.
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2.4.2 Both firms price-match
In this subsection, we focus only on equilibria where the supports of the firm
equilibrium pricing distributions do not have any breaks. The appendix shows
that for θS ∈ (0, 1], these supports can only take one of four types, two of which
contain no breaks. We do not show whether equilibria with breaks exist, however,
in the appendix, we outline a procedure for solving for one such equilibrium.
In any equilibrium without breaks, p
1
= p
2
= p and p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = min {v, rj}
where rj ≤ ri. The equilibrium is symmetric if and only if βS = βN = 1/2, in which
case rj = ri. In this case, there are no mass points in equilibrium. As a result, both
firms always run sales—that is, they price below p¯ with certainty. Alternatively,
the equilibrium may be asymmetric, in which case one firm has a mass point at
p¯. In equilibrium, non-shoppers who observe a price of rj at firm i (and are hence
indifferent between stopping and searching firm j) stop. Therefore, because firms
never price above the smaller of the two reservation prices, non-shoppers never
search in equilibrium. This means that in equilibrium, price-matching can only
impact non-shoppers indirectly because they cannot use price-matching guarantees
after observing only one price.
Proposition 2.1 characterizes Sequential Equilibria for the subgame where both
firms offer price-matching guarantees and θS ∈ (0, 1]. The proposition character-
izes equilibria where βN ≥ 1/2. Equilibria with βN < 1/2 can be similarly obtained
and are left to the reader.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that firms are exogenously required to offer price-matching
guarantees and θS ∈ (0, 1]. Then there exists a set of Sequential Equilibria where
both firms distribute prices over support
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[
p = min {v, r∗}
[
(1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN
] θS
βSθS+1−βS
, p¯ = min {v, r∗}
]
and the equilibrium reservation price, r∗ = r∗1 = r
∗
2 equals
r∗ =
r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) if r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) ≤ v∞ otherwise ,
r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) = c
{
1− [(1− µ) βN ]
θS
βSθS+1−βS
µ (1− βS) (1− θS)
×
{
[µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ]
(1−βS)(1−θS)
1−βS(1−θS) − [(1− µ) βN ]
(1−βS)(1−θS)
1−βS(1−θS)
}}−1 .
Suppose that firm 1 has a mass point at p¯. Then it distributes prices according to
F1 (p) =
{
1 +
(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
}1− (p
p
) (1−βS)θS+βS
θS

over
[
p, p¯
)
, while firm 2 distributes prices according to
F2 (p) =
[
1 +
(1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS)
][
1−
(
p
p
)βSθS+1−βS
θS
]
.
In equilibrium, the expected prices for the two firms equal each other.
In equilibrium, βN must be such that firm 1 is the one with the mass point
at p¯. Numerically, we can show that this requires that βN > 1/2 and that as a
result, βS > 1/2. The case where firm 2 is the one with the mass point at p¯ follows
similarly and is left to the reader. When βN = βS = 1/2, neither firm has a mass
point and we are in support type 1 in Lemma 2.1.
In every equilibrium described in Proposition 2.1, non-shoppers randomly choose
a firm to search first and make a purchase there, whereas all shoppers search both
firms and obtain the lower price. However, contrary to the subgame without
matching, the lower price is not always obtained at the firm with the lower listed
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price. For instance, if firm 1 has the lower listed price, the 1 − βS shoppers that
search firm 2 first all purchase from firm 1, but of the βS shoppers that search firm
1 first, βSθS purchase from firm 1 while βS (1− θS) obtain a price-match at firm
2. The inability to capture all shoppers at the lower listed price diminishes firms’
incentive to set lower prices.
Proposition 2.1 tells us that price-matching guarantees offer no consumer ben-
efit because a portion of consumers never uses them, while the remainder could
procure the lower listed price with or without them. This is not as unreasonable
as it seems at first glance. Individuals who find search costly are likely to find sat-
isfying the non-pecuniary requirements that many firms impose on price-matching
customers costly as well, so it should not be a surprise that such individuals do
not use price-matching guarantees. Conversely, an individual who is willing to
go through the “hassle” of applying a price-matching guarantee is likely to be an
individual who is willing to shop around for price.
Because all shoppers will freely obtain the lowest price regardless of where
they begin their search, they are indifferent regarding which firm to sample first
in equilibrium. However, since the firm price distributions are functions of βS in
this subgame, shopper search behavior influences expected prices, which in turn
determine which firm non-shoppers want to sample first. In equilibrium, for every
βS, there is a corresponding βN that makes non-shoppers indifferent between which
firm to sample first (by setting expected prices in the two firms equal to each other),
resulting in a multiplicity of equilibria.
When βN , βS > 1/2, firm 1 will capture a higher proportion of non-shoppers
while firm 2 expects to capture more shoppers. Firm 1 sets higher prices and has
fewer sales than in the symmetric case because when it serves a higher proportion of
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non-shoppers, it loses more profit from these captive consumers whenever it lowers
its price. Even though firm 2 has fewer non-shoppers than in the symmetric case, it
will tend to have higher prices as well because it no longer needs to lower prices as
much to have the same probability of capturing the bulk of the shoppers as it did
in the symmetric case. Thus, both firms have higher prices and expected profits
than in the symmetric case. Intuitively, an asymmetric equilibrium may result in
the presence of price-matching because more shoppers may prefer to purchase at
a particular firm, but are lexicographic, valuing a purchase at a lower price over a
purchase at a preferred firm. Price-matching will allow some shoppers to purchase
at a preferred firm at the lower price even when that firm does not list the lower
price. If we are to compare the two firms with each other when βN , βS > 1/2,
firm 1 runs sales less frequently than firm 2, but since expected prices are equal in
equilibrium, when firm 1 does run a sale, it is expected to run a bigger one.
The next proposition says that when θS = 0, that is, all shoppers invoke price-
matching guarantees when they are available, price-matching leads to a unique
monopolistic equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that firms are exogenously required to offer price-matching
guarantees and θS = 0. Then there exists a unique Sequential Equilibrium where
both firms set price v and r∗1 = r
∗
2 = v + c.
When θS = 0, lower prices do not attract additional customers. In particular,
shoppers that encounter a higher price at the second firm they search will use a
price-matching guarantee at the second firm rather than go back to the first firm
to obtain a lower price. As a result, firms extract all consumer welfare by pricing
at v.
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2.4.3 Only firm 1 price-matches
In this subsection we examine equilibria that arise when firm 1 is exogenously
required to offer price-matching guarantees while firm 2 is required not to. The
analysis when only firm 2 is exogenously required to offer price-matching guaran-
tees follows similarly and is left to the reader.
Lemma 2.2 in the appendix narrows down the set of possible prices that firms
can charge in equilibrium in the same way as Lemma 2.1. Corollary 2.2 in the
appendix applies to Lemma 2.2 exactly as it did to Lemma 2.1. As before, we only
examine equilibria where the firm supports do not have any breaks.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that firm 1 is exogenously required to offer price-
matching guarantees while firm 2 is required not to. Then there exists a set of
Sequential Equilibria where both firms distribute prices over support[
p = min {v, r∗}
{
(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)
}
, p¯ = min {v, r∗}
]
and the equilibrium reservation price, r∗ = r∗1 = r
∗
2 equals
r∗ =
r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) if r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) ≤ v∞ otherwise ,
r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN)=c
{
1− (1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
× ln
{
1 +
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
(1− µ) (1− βN)
}}−1
.
Firm 1 distributes prices according to
F1 (p) =
{
1 +
(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
}(
1− p
p
)
,
while firm 2 distributes prices according to
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F2 (p) =
[
1 +
(1− µ) βN
µ
][
1−
(
p
p
) 1
βS+θS−βSθS
]
over
[
p, p¯
)
with a mass point at p¯. In equilibrium, the expected prices for the two
firms equal each other.
As in the equilibria described in Proposition 2.1, non-shoppers randomly choose
a firm to search first and make a purchase there. Numerically, it can be shown that
βN < 1/2 must hold for expected prices in the two firms to equal each other and
that in this case, firm 2 will be the one with the mass point at p¯. Since βN < 1/2,
firm 1 captures a smaller proportion of non-shoppers. Knowing that it will have
fewer non-shoppers with certainty, firm 1 offers a price-matching guarantee to
increase the expected number of shoppers that it captures in equilibrium, while firm
2 runs fewer sales than it would if neither firm offered price-matching guarantees
to exploit its larger amount of “captive” non-shoppers.
The next section completes this analysis by endogenizing firms’ price-matching
decisions. It will be shown that the equilibrium outcome that prevails with regard
to firm matching depends on firm beliefs about the amount of asymmetry expected
to occur on and off the equilibrium path. Because of the large number of equilibria
that can prevail in the complete game, we limit ourselves to a numerical analysis
with no randomization over price-matching.
2.5 Market equilibrium (numerical analysis)
In the first stage of the game, firms must decide whether or not to offer consumers
a price-matching guarantee. For each firm, this decision depends on a comparison
of the profits that it expects to obtain in each of the pricing subgames discussed in
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the previous section. However, this analysis is made complicated by the fact that
in the subgame where both firms price-match and in the two subgames where only
one firm matches, multiple equilibria may occur. For each set of price-matching
decisions, these equilibria differ in the βN , βS pair that prevails. For example, sup-
pose that both firms offer price-matching guarantees on the equilibrium path, half
of the consumers are shoppers (µ = 0.5) and half of the shoppers are willing to in-
voke price-matching guarantees (θS = 0.5). Moreover, suppose that the consumer
valuation for the product is high enough not to be binding (that is, p¯ = r∗ < v)
and search costs are normalized to one. A natural candidate for equilibrium in
this case is the symmetric one where βN = βS = 0.5 and both firms choose prices
from the same distribution on the equilibrium path. In this case, both firms expect
profit of 1.19. An alternative outcome given the parameters above is one where
βN = 0.6 and βS = 0.8574, in which case firm 1 expects profit of 1.22 while firm 2
expects profit of 1.38. Mathematically, multiple βN , βS pairs may prevail because
in equilibrium, the solution for βN and βS is obtained using the single equation
that sets the expected prices in the two firms equal to each other, making all
consumers indifferent between which firm to search first. Intuitively, there is no
reason to prefer one of the two outcomes above over the other because firms do
not set βN or βS. Instead, in reality, one may think of the equilibrium outcome
that prevails as the byproduct of multiple iterations of the pricing subgame for
a particular industry or product category, where firm beliefs about βN , βS pairs
evolve according to past observations of consumer behavior.
The equilibrium also depends on beliefs about βN and βS off the equilibrium
path. Consider, for instance, the subgame where firm 1 offers a price-matching
guarantee, but firm 2 does not and all the exogenous parameters are the same as
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in the example above. One possible equilibrium βN , βS pair for this subgame is
βN = 0.3586 and βS = 0.001. In this equilibrium, firm 1 expects profit of 1.46 and
firm 2 expects profit of 1.23. This subgame can be played on the equilibrium path
if firms believe that in the subgame where both firms price-match, the symmetric
equilibrium will prevail. However, if firms believe that when both firms price-
match, the asymmetric outcome above will prevail instead, firm 2 will deviate by
offering a price-matching guarantee to increase its profit from 1.23 to 1.38. For
completeness, we note that the unique symmetric equilibrium in the subgame with
no matching yields expected profit of 0.55 for both firms, so firm 1 will never want
to deviate from offering a price-matching guarantee in this case.
The following statement summarizes the above discussion based on a numerical
comparison of the equilibria that can prevail in this game.
Equilibrium. In equilibrium, either both firms will offer price-matching guaran-
tees or only one firm will offer a price-matching guarantee. In any equilibrium
outcome where firms are given the option of offering price-matching guarantees,
expected prices and firm profits are higher than when price-matching is not an op-
tion.
For any given value of v and c, we can numerically calculate all possible equi-
libria. There are several factors that affect expected prices and firm profits as
well as the bounds on firm price distributions in equilibrium. As in Stahl (1989),
regardless of firm matching decisions, when the proportion of non-shoppers in the
population increases, so do expected prices and profits. Firms are motivated to
lower prices specifically to attract those consumers who observe all of them and
when such consumers make up a smaller proportion of the population, there is less
29
incentive to lower prices. Likewise, expected prices and profits grow when more
shoppers accept price-matching guarantees (θS grows) because the firm with the
lower price attracts a smaller proportion of all shoppers.
Table 2.1: Firm Profits When Both Firms Match1,2
βN = 0.50 βN = 0.55 βN = 0.60 βS = 0.999
µ θS pi1 = pi2 pi1 pi2 pi1 pi2 pi1 pi2
.20 .20 10.75 10.79 11.75 N/A N/A 10.80 12.03
.50 .20 3.12 3.15 3.37 3.18 3.62 3.24 4.32
.80 .20 1.06 1.09 1.13 1.11 1.20 1.233 1.713
.20 .50 4.27 N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.29 4.59
.50 .50 1.19 1.20 1.29 1.22 1.38 1.23 1.46
.80 .50 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.57
.20 .80 2.65 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.66 2.73
.50 .80 0.71 0.72 0.77 N/A N/A 0.72 0.77
.80 .80 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.23
1µ consumers have no cost of search (shoppers), while 1 − µ have search cost c = 1 (non-
shoppers). θS shoppers always ignore price-matching guarantees. βN and βS respectively
represent the fraction of shoppers and non-shoppers who begin search at firm 1. Non-shoppers’
valuation for the good is assumed to be strictly higher than their equilibrium reservation price
(their maximum willingness to pay for the good).
2Equilibrium βS varies with µ and θS for a given value of βN and vice versa. N/A implies
that no equilibrium exists for the given value of βN . Rightmost column gives results for
βS = 0.999 to approximate profits with highest level of asymmetry.
3No equilibrium with βS = 0.999. Results given are for βN = 0.999 and βS = 0.80.
Table 2.1 shows that this is the case for expected profits when both firms price-
match in equilibrium while Table 2.2 does so for equilibria where only firm 2 offers
a price-matching guarantee. Each entry in these tables gives the expected profit
of a firm for a given value of µ and θS as well as a prevailing equilibrium value of
βN or βS. Each value of βN corresponds to a unique value of βS which is not given
in the tables and vice versa.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show that expected profits grow in the amount of asymmetry
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that prevails in equilibrium, as measured by the difference in the proportion of non-
shoppers served by the two firms. Thus, as βN , the proportion of non-shoppers
who search firm 1 first, increases from 0.50 to 1, so do the profits of both firms.
Table 2.2: Firm Profits When Only Firm 2 Matches1,2
βN = 0.55 βN = 0.60 βS = 0.999
µ θS pi1 pi2 pi1 pi2 pi1 pi2
.20 .20 5.78 6.29 N/A N/A 10.75 11.99
.50 .20 0.71 0.76 0.94 1.07 3.23 4.30
.80 .20 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.453 0.633
.20 .50 N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.29 4.58
.50 .50 0.71 0.76 0.94 1.07 1.23 1.46
.80 .50 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.42 0.57
.20 .80 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.66 2.73
.50 .80 0.71 0.76 N/A N/A 0.72 0.77
.80 .80 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.23
1µ consumers have no cost of search (shoppers), while 1 − µ have search cost c = 1 (non-
shoppers). θS shoppers always ignore price-matching guarantees. βN and βS respectively
represent the fraction of shoppers and non-shoppers who begin search at firm 1. Non-shoppers’
valuation for the good is assumed to be strictly higher than their equilibrium reservation price
(their maximum willingness to pay for the good).
2Equilibrium βS varies with µ and θS for a given value of βN and vice versa. N/A implies
that no equilibrium exists for the given value of βN . Rightmost column gives results for
βS = 0.999 to approximate profits with highest level of asymmetry.
3No equilibrium with βS = 0.999. Results given are for βN = 0.999 and βS = 0.80.
Moreover, the tables show that when µ is sufficiently low or θS is sufficiently
high, the amount of asymmetry that can occur in equilibrium is limited. Consider
µ = θS = 0.20 in Table 2.1. If a proportion of non-shoppers only slightly higher
than 0.55 searches firm 1 first, because these non-shoppers will purchase from firm
1 with certainty and since non-shoppers make up a relatively large proportion of
the population, firm 1 has relatively little incentive to lower its price in an attempt
to capture shoppers while firm 2 wants to lower its price to attract shoppers to
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compensate itself for the low proportion of non-shoppers who search it. These
contrasting motivations will induce firm 1 to have a higher expected price than
that of firm 2, contradicting the fact that more non-shoppers begin their search at
firm 1. If θS increases to 0.50, even βN = 0.55 cannot be supported in equilibrium.
When fewer shoppers accept price-matching guarantees, the firm with the lower
price can capture a larger proportion of them, increasing firm 2’s incentive to lower
its price to make up for a dearth of non-shoppers who search it.
Corresponding results for expected prices and the upper bound of firm price
distributions (assuming p¯ = r∗ < v) follow precisely as in Tables 2.1 and 2.2:
that is expected prices and upper bounds are increasing in the proportion of non-
shoppers, the usage of price-matching guarantees, and the amount of asymmetry.
Results for expected prices and profits persist even if v is low enough to bind (so
that p¯ = v < r∗ = ∞). Thus, by varying v, we can decompose the first price
increasing effect discussed in the introduction from the second—expected prices
and profits increase in 1− µ, 1− θS, and in the amount of asymmetry, even if the
equilibrium reservation price remains the same.
We summarize the numerical results above in the following statement.
Comparative Statics. Given firms’ equilibrium price-matching decisions, ex-
pected prices and firm profits are increasing in 1−µ, 1− θS, and |2βN − 1|. More-
over, r∗ is non-decreasing in 1− µ, 1− θS, and |2βN − 1|.
A casual examination of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 suggests that if firms maintain the
same beliefs about βN in both subgames (and if they believe that 1 − βN will
be played in the subgame where only Firm 1 matches), then the only possible
type of equilibrium outcome is the one where both firms choose to offer price-
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matching guarantees. However, this outcome is inconsistent with what we observe
in reality—that is, we often see only a fraction of the firms producing the same
good offering price-matching guarantees. Within the context of this model, this
real world observation implies that firms that choose not to price-match believe
that a more symmetric equilibrium would prevail had they chosen to do so, leading
to lower profits than not matching.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Search
This study places the concept of price-matching into a broad literature on search.
Initially, an important purpose of this literature was to address the Diamond para-
dox (Diamond 1974), which says that when information acquisition is costly for
consumers, the prevalent pricing outcome among firms selling a homogeneous good
is the monopoly price. The search literature provides explanations for why this
result does not persist in the real world. Explanations outside of consumer hetero-
geneity (Stahl 1989) include firm cost heterogeneity (Reinganum 1979), uncertainty
regarding the number of free price samples or “noisy” search (Burdett and Judd
1983), and lack of common knowledge about consumer valuation for the product
on the part of firms (Kuksov 2006).
The choice of Stahl (1989) for the underlying framework of this paper was made
for the purpose of tractability-it proved to be a very convenient way to endogenize
consumer price information acquisition. In his paper, Stahl shows that by varying
the proportion of shoppers from zero to one, we can make a continuous transition
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from the monopoly result obtained by Diamond to the Bertrand outcome that
prevails when price information is free for all consumers. Interestingly, in this
paper, a similar transition can be achieved between the Diamond outcome and the
Stahl price dispersed equilibrium by varying θS between zero and one. If we stick to
the earlier suggested hassle cost interpretation of θS (see footnote 7), this means
that if all shoppers use price-matching guarantees, the monopoly price results
(Proposition 2.2). On the contrary, if all shoppers find price-matching activity
costly, as in Hviid and Shaffer (1999), the guarantees are never used (though unlike
in Hviid and Shaffer, the unique equilibrium is in mixed pricing strategies, not the
Bertrand outcome). Throughout most of this paper, we have thus assumed that
there is a positive mass of shoppers who do not find the activity of price-matching
a hassle.10
2.6.2 Heterogeneous non-shoppers
While it is crucial that shoppers use price-matching guarantees for price-matching
to have any effect in this model, as mentioned earlier, the price increasing effect
stemming from a decline in non-shopper search activity is secondary. In fact, the
decline is somewhat superficial in that non-shoppers do not search to begin with.
An interesting extension involves heterogeneous non-shoppers who vary in the size
of their search cost. Stahl (1996) shows that non-shoppers with a low enough
search cost may search more than one firm in such a set up because firms can
price above their reservation price as long as this still guarantees them a positive
10An alternative explanation suggested by Maarten Janssen and others is that all consumers
face a positive hassle cost of using a price-matching guarantee, but that recall is also costly for
everyone and that shoppers are heterogeneous with respect to either the size of the hassle cost or
the cost of going back to a previously visited firm. Shoppers who find price-matching less costly
than recalling a previously sampled lower price will use the price-matching guarantee.
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mass of higher search cost non-shoppers. Since price-matching raises non-shopper
reservation prices, a heterogeneous non-shopper setup may result in an observable
decline in non-shopper search activity by stopping low search cost non-shoppers
from searching beyond the first firm.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper explores the effects that price-matching guarantees have on firms and
consumers when consumers optimally search for price. Price-matching guarantees
alter the shopping behavior of both types of consumers in our model in a way that
encourages firms to raise prices. When consumers who have no cost of price search
use price-matching guarantees at firms that list higher prices, firms are discouraged
from lowering prices in order to attract such consumers. Understanding this price
increasing effect, consumers who face an opportunity cost of searching for price
accept higher prices at already sampled firms because they anticipate that further
search is less likely to yield a lower price. In addition, because consumers with
no search costs may be able to obtain the lower price at either firm, there is
a multiplicity of asymmetric equilibria where more asymmetry leads to higher
expected prices and firm profits.
While the underlying mechanism driving the effects of price-matching in our
model is new, this paper is not orthogonal to the previous literature. Both welfare
diminishing tacit collusion and price discrimination can be found in our model.
Tacit collusion occurs since firms understand that a rival’s “threat” to match a
lower price entails a smaller benefit from any incremental price cut. Price dis-
crimination occurs because consumers who have no cost of price search may use
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a price-match to secure a lower price from the firm listing the higher price while
the firm’s remaining customers pay the higher listed price. However, contrary to
the result in signaling models of price-match, where ex-ante asymmetries persist
ex-post, we find that price-matching alone is enough to generate an asymmetric
equilibrium. In the model presented, asymmetries always reduce consumer wel-
fare, but it would be interesting to see how differences in firm production costs
influence search behavior when price-matching is allowed. This is not immediately
obvious from the above analysis. Ex-ante cost differences have the potential to
reduce asymmetries ex-post, but it is unclear if this is a good thing because it may
entail more purchases from the higher cost firm.
This study has significance for future empirical work. Recent empirical litera-
ture has focused primarily on comparisons of price observations between firms with
and without price-matching guarantees (Moorthy and Winter 2006, Arbatskaya et
al. 2006). However, the results in this paper suggest that such cross-sectional
findings point purely to underlying cost differences between firms without telling
us the effect of adopting a matching policy. If firms are homogeneous in costs, ex-
pected prices among firms that differ in the adoption of a price-matching guarantee
can remain the same. Therefore, a time component is necessary for a thorough
analysis; although even this may not be foolproof, as the adoption of a matching
policy may follow a change in production costs. A complete analysis will look at
changes in consumer shopping behavior consistent with those predicted by this
paper. A survey test of our model could ask individuals who use price-matching
guarantees to secure the lowest price if they would obtain that price regardless
by purchasing somewhere else. An affirmative answer tells us that price-matching
guarantees are in fact anti-competitive because they keep consumers away from
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firms with lower listed prices.
2.8 Appendix
We first define some useful notation. As with shoppers, for non-shoppers who
have searched both firms, we assume that θN ∈ [0, 1] will ignore price-matching
guarantees and always purchase from the firm with the lower listed price. The
remaining 1 − θN will invoke a price-matching guarantee at the last firm they
stopped in when one is available and necessary to obtain the lower price there and
purchase from the firm with the lower listed price otherwise. Let αS(N) ∈
[
0, θS(N)
]
be the proportion of shoppers (non-shoppers) who buy from the first firm they
searched after having observed the same price listed in both firms.11 Let γ be the
proportion of non-shoppers who do not search after freely observing a price of rj
at firm i.
Definition 2.1. We say that firms have a mutual mass point when each firm has
a mass point at the same price. We say that firms have a mutual break when each
firm’s equilibrium support has a break over the same price interval.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that firms are exogenously required to offer price-matching
guarantees and that θS ∈ (0, 1]. In equilibrium, the supports of the firm pricing
distributions can only take one of the four following forms:
1. Completely symmetric, no breaks: p
1
=p
2
=p; p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯=min {v, r1 = r2}.
2. Single mass point, no breaks: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm i has a mass point at
p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = min {v, rj}, rj ≤ ri.
11The restriction αS(N) ≤ θS(N) is used for mathematical tractability. It says that when a firm
undercuts a tie, it cannot lose customers.
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3. Two mass points, mutual break: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm j has a mass point at
ri < min {v, rj}; mutual break over (ri, pu) for pu ∈ (ri, p¯); p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ =
min {v, rj}, firm i has a mass point at p¯.
4. Two mass points, single break: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm j has a mass point at
p¯j = ri < min {v, rj}; firm i has a break over (ri, p¯i) for p¯i = min {v, rj}
and a mass point at p¯i.
The following claims complete the proof of Lemma 2.1.
Claim 2.1. v ≥ min {p¯1, p¯2} ≥ p1 = p2 = p ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose p
1
< p
2
≤ v. Then, for p1 ∈
[
p
1
, p
2
)
, firm 1’s expected profit is
p1 {µ [θS + (1− βS) (1− θS)]
+ (1− µ) {βN + (1− βN) {[1− F2 (r1)] + (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)}}}
(2.4)
(since p
2
< r2 by definition), which is increasing in p1, contradicting the equi-
librium. If p
1
≤ v < p
2
, for p1 ∈
[
p
1
, v
)
, firm 1’s expected profit is given by
Expression (2.4), which is increasing in p1, so it must be the case that p1 = v. But
if v = p
1
< p
2
, then F1 (v) = 1 (because firm 1 doesn’t make any profit at prices
above v) and firm 2 expects profit of µβS (1− θS) v everywhere on its support. For
sufficiently small ε > 0, firm 2 benefits by shifting its mass to v − ε for expected
profit of (v − ε) {µ [θS + βS (1− θS)] + (1− µ) (1− βS)}. Finally, if v < p1 ≤ p2,
then both firms make zero profits and either can increase profit by shifting mass
to v, so p
2
≤ p
1
. By a similar argument, p
2
≤ p
1
and v ≥ p
1
= p
2
= p. Since prices
below zero result in negative profit, p ≥ 0.12
12If p = 0, then there must be zero density at p = 0 because at pi = ε < min {rj , v}, firm i
will make money off its non-shoppers.
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Suppose v < min {p¯1, p¯2}. Then, for pi > v, firm i expects no profit with
probability Pr (pj > v) > 0 and since consumers never purchase at prices above
v, firm i will only profit from consumers that accept its price-match offer after
they had rejected a price no higher than v at firm j. Thus, firm i cannot lose
money from such consumers by shifting mass above v down to v. However, by
doing so, it now also expects to earn a positive profit with probability Pr (pj > v),
a contradiction.
Claim 2.2. There are no mutual mass points.
Proof. Suppose that there is a mutual mass point at p. Firm 1’s expected profit
at p when firm 2 charges p as well is
p {µ [βSαS + (1− βS) (1− αS)]
+ (1− µ) {βN [Ip<r2 + [γ + αN (1− γ)] Ip=r2 + αNIp>r2 ]
+ (1− βN) (1− αN) [(1− γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}}
(2.5)
where I is an indicator function. Suppose instead that firm 1 deviates to p − ε
while firm 2 maintains its price at p. Firm 1’s expected profit will be
(p− ε) {µ [βSθS + (1− βS)]
+ (1− µ) {βN [Ip−ε<r2 + [γ + θN (1− γ)] Ip−ε=r2 + θNIp−ε>r2 ]
+ (1− βN) [(1− γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}}
(2.6)
Expression (2.5) is smaller than Expression (2.6) provided that ε is sufficiently
small.
Suppose firm 2 chooses a price other than p. Lowering the price charged never
reduces the number of sales so the loss to firm 1 from lowering the price by ε is at
most ε. However, when p is charged with positive probability, lowering the price
by ε will with positive probability lead to a gain and with the complementary
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probability at worst lead to a loss of ε. Therefore, by shifting its mass point at p
to p− ε for sufficiently small ε firm 1 increases its expected profit, a contradiction.
For the case αS = θS, αN = θN , and βS = βN = 1, firm 1 cannot profitably
undercut the mutual mass point, but firm 2 can.
Claim 2.3. The only possible breaks in the equilibrium supports are:
(i) If p¯i < p¯j, there is a break at (p¯i, p¯j) ∈ Sj.
(ii) If r = ri = rj < p¯i = p¯j, there may be a mutual break with lower bound r.
(iii) If ri 6= rj and firm i has a mass point at rj, there may be a mutual break
with lower bound rj.
Proof. Let S1 and S2 be respectively, the equilibrium supports for firms 1 and 2.
Define H =
(
pd, pu
) ∈ int(S1 ∩ S2).
Suppose first, without loss of generality, that in equilibrium, firm 2 has no
support over H, but that firm 1 does. Firm 1’s expected profit at some p1 ∈ H is
µ {p1 (θSβS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) {p1βN {Ip1<r2 + {γ + θN (1− γ) [1− F2 (p1)]} Ip1=r2
+ θN [1− F2 (p1)] Ip1>r2}
+ (1− βN) {p1 [1− F2 (r1) + (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)] Ip1<r1 + p1 [1− F2 (r1)] Ip1=r1
+ {p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + r1 (1− θN) (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)
+ (1− θN) E [p2|r1 < p2 < p1] [F2 (p1)− F2 (r1)]} Ip1>r1}} (2.7)
As firm 1 raises p1 along H, its expected profit is increasing since F2 (p1) is constant
along H (and equal to F2 (r1) if r1 ∈ H). Thus, if r2 /∈ H, firm 1 could increase
expected profits by shifting all its mass in H slightly below pu (to pu if firm 2
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doesn’t have a mass point there), a contradiction. If r2 ∈ H, firm 1 can increase
expected profits by shifting all mass in
(
pd, r2
)
slightly below r2, and all mass
in
(
r2, p
d
)
either slightly below r2 or to p
u, again contradicting the equilibrium.
A similar argument applies when firm 1 has no support over H, but firm 2 does.
This tells us that any breaks in S1 ∩ S2 are mutual.
Now suppose that neither firm randomizes over H in equilibrium. Suppose first
that pd 6= r1, pd 6= r2 and that neither firm has a mass point at pd. Then either
firm 1 has a strictly higher expected profit at pu (or slightly below r2 if r2 ∈ H)
than at pd, or firm 2 has a strictly higher expected profit at pu (or slightly below
r1 if r1 ∈ H) than at pd, or possibly both, if neither firm has a mass point at pu,
contradicting the equilibrium.
Suppose that firm i has a mass point at pd 6= rj. Since there are no mutual
mass points, firm i could increase profits by shifting its mass point to pu (or slightly
below pu if firm j has a mass point there, or slightly below rj if rj ∈ H).
If pd = rj 6= ri and firm i has no mass point at pd, firm j’s expected profit will
be strictly higher at pu (or slightly below pu if firm i has a mass point there, or
slightly below ri if ri ∈ H) than at pd. But if firm i does have a mass point at pd,
then it is possible that profits are the same at pd and pu for each firm. If γ 6= 1,
firm i can profitably deviate by shifting its mass point slightly below pd. In doing
so, it retains 1− γ non-shoppers who search after observing a price of rj and have
a positive probability of purchasing from firm j. However, if γ = 1, neither firm
has a profitable deviation. This may also be the case if, pd = r1 = r2.
From Claim 2.1, we know that both S1 and S2 have the same lower bound,
p, so S1∆S2 ∈ (min {p¯1, p¯2} , max {p¯1, p¯2}]. Suppose, without loss of generality,
that p¯1 > p¯2. At p1 ∈ (p¯2, p¯1], firm 1’s expected profit is
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µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2] + (1− µ) {p1βN (Ip1<r2 + γIp1=r2) Ip1≤v
+(1− θN) (1− βN) {E [p2|r1 < p2] [1− F2 (r1)]+r1 (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)}}
(2.8)
If p¯2 < r2, then for βN 6= 0, firm 1’s expected profit is increasing in p1 along
(p¯2, min {v, r2}) and is strictly greater anywhere in (p¯2, min {v, r2}) than at any
price above min {v, r2}. As a result, for ε > 0 sufficiently small, firm 1 can increase
profit by shifting mass in (p¯2, p¯1] to min {v, r2}− ε (likewise if p¯2 = min {v, r2}).
Therefore, when p¯2 ≤ r2, either S1∆S2= {p¯1}= {min {v, r2}}, or S1∆S2 = ∅.
Suppose S1∆S2 = {p¯1}. If firm 2 has no mass point at p¯2, this means that
firm 1’s expected profit at p¯1 is strictly higher than its expected profit at p¯2, a
contradiction. If firm 2 has a mass point at p¯2 6= r1, since there are no mutual
mass points, firm 2 can profitably shift the mass point to slightly below p¯1 (or
slightly below r1 if r1 ∈ (p¯2, p¯1]). However, if γ = 1 and firm 2 has a mass point
at p¯2 = r1, E pi1 (p¯1, F2 (p¯1)) = E pi1 (p¯2, F2 (p¯2)), and F1 (r1) is large enough, then
neither firm has a profitable deviation. Following the proof of Claim 2.5, we will
discuss why an equilibrium where r2 < p¯2 < p¯1 cannot exist. A similar argument
applies when p¯2 > p¯1.
Corollary 2.1. The equilibrium supports are the same except if p¯i = rj < p¯j =
min {v, ri}.
Claim 2.4. Firm i does not have a mass point in the lower bound or the interior
of firm j’s equilibrium support, except possibly at rj.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that firm 2 has a mass point at p ∈
S1\ {p¯1}, and suppose that p 6= r1. Firm 1’s expected profit at p− ε when firm 2
charges p is given by Expression (2.6), whereas its expected profit at p+ ε is
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µp (1− θS) (1− βS) + (1− µ) {(p+ ε) βN (Ip+ε<r2 + γIp+ε=r2)
+p (1− θN) (1− βN) [(1− γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}
(2.9)
Expression (2.9) is smaller than Expression (2.6) provided that ε is sufficiently
small. Suppose firm 2 chooses a price other than p. Lowering the price charged
never reduces the number of sales so the loss to firm 1 from lowering the price by
2ε or less is at most 2ε. However, when p is charged with positive probability,
lowering the price by 2ε or less will with positive probability lead to a gain and
with the complementary probability at worst lead to a loss of 2ε. Therefore, by
shifting its mass between p and p+ε to p−ε for sufficiently small ε, firm 1 increases
its expected profit, a contradiction. By a similar argument, firm 1 cannot have a
mass point at p ∈ S2\ {p¯2}, except possibly if p = r2.
Claim 2.5. If p¯ = p¯1 = p¯2 then either
(i) p¯ = min {v, r1, r2}, the supports have no breaks, and at most one firm can
have a mass point at p¯, or
(ii) p¯ = min {v, max {r1, r2}}, there is a mutual break above min {r1, r2} < p¯,
firm i has a mass point at rj, and firm j has a mass point at p¯.
Proof. Suppose that p¯ = p¯1 = p¯2 and neither firm has a mass point at p¯. From
Claims 2.1 and 2.4 we know that p < p¯ ≤ v. Suppose, without loss of generality,
that p¯ < min {v, r2}. At p¯, firm 1’s expected profit is given by Expression (2.8)
(with p1 = p¯), which is increasing in p1 along (p¯, min {v, r2}) when βN 6= 0, a
contradiction. Suppose instead that p¯ > min {v, r2} = r2. For any p1 ∈ (r2, p¯),
in equilibrium, Epi1 (p¯) = E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)). E pi1 (p¯) is given by Expression (2.8)
(with p1 = p¯). If r2 ≥ r1, for p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) equals
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µ {p1 (θSβS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) {p1βNθN [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− βN) {r1 (1− θN) (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)
+ p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θN) E [p2|r1 < p2 < p1] [F2 (p1)− F2 (r1)]}} (2.10)
Setting Expression (2.8) equal to Expression (2.10) and differentiating with respect
to p1 gives us
[µ (θSβS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) (θNβN + 1− βN)] [1− F2 (p1)]
− [µθS + (1− µ) θN ] p1F2′ (p1) = 0
(2.11)
Solving the differential equation given by Equation (2.11) using the initial value
F2 (p¯) = 1 gives us F2 (p1) = 1 for all p1 ∈ (r2, p¯], a contradiction. Similarly, if
r1 ∈ (r2, p¯), then Expression (2.10) represents firm 1’s expected profit at (r1, p¯)
and F2 (p1) = 1 for all p1 ∈ (r1, p¯], a contradiction. If on the other hand, r1 ≥ p¯,
E pi1 (p¯) becomes µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2] while Epi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) at p1 ∈ (r2, p¯)
becomes
µ {p1 (θSβS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) βNθNp1 [1− F2 (p1)] (2.12)
Setting µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2] equal to Expression (2.12) and solving the result-
ing differential equation using the initial value F2 (p¯) = 1 again gives us F2 (p1) = 1
for all p1 ∈ (r2, p¯], a contradiction. Hence, for βN 6= 0, p¯ = min {v, r2}. By a
similar argument, for βN 6= 1, p¯ = min {v, r1}, so when neither firm has a mass
point at p¯, p¯ = min {v, r1, r2}.
From Claim 2.2, we know that at most one firm can have a mass point at p¯,
say firm j. If γ = 1 or v < ri, then following the argument in the paragraph
above, p¯ = min {v, ri}. Otherwise, firm j cannot have a mass point at p¯ (using
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reasoning similar to that in the proof of Claim 2.3). Moreover, if rj ≥ ri, then
p¯ = min {v, r1, r2} and from Claim 2.3, we know that the firm supports have
no breaks. Conversely, suppose rj < ri (and therefore, rj < v). Without loss of
generality, let i = 1. From Claim 2.4, we know that firm 2 cannot have a mass
point at r2. At r2, firm 1 expects profit of
µ {r2 (θSβS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (r2)] +
(1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < r2]F2 (r2)}+ (1− µ) βNr2
(2.13)
whereas at p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) is given by Expression (2.12). By def-
inition, for p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), 0 < F2 (r2) ≤ F2 (p1), so for p1 close enough to r2,
Expression (2.13) is strictly greater than Expression (2.12). Therefore, r2 must be
the lower bound for a break in S1 and we are in Case (iii) of Claim 2.3).
Notice that Claim 2.5 rules out Case (ii) in Claim 2.3. Moreover, following the
same procedure used in Claim 2.5, it is easy to show that an equilibrium where
rj < p¯j < p¯i cannot exist. In particular, by setting Epii (p¯i) = E pii (pi, Fj (pi))
for pi ∈ (rj, p¯j] and solving for Fj, we see that Fj (pi) = 1 for all pi ∈ (rj, p¯j], a
contradiction.
The corollary below is a technical result necessary for the existence of equilibria
with support types 2, 3 or 4. It follows immediately from the proof of Lemma 2.1.
Corollary 2.2. For equilibria with support types 2, 3 or 4 in Lemma 2.1 to exist,
all non-shoppers who sample firm i first, must stop searching after observing a
price of rj unless v < rj.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that firms are exogenously required to offer price-
matching guarantees and θS ∈ (0, 1]. Then there exists a set of Sequential Equi-
libria where both firms distribute prices over support
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[
p = min {v, r∗}
[
(1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN
] θS
βSθS+1−βS
, p¯ = min {v, r∗}
]
and the equilibrium reservation price, r∗ = r∗1 = r
∗
2 equals
r∗ =
r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) if r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) ≤ v∞ otherwise ,
r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) = c
{
1− [(1− µ) βN ]
θS
βSθS+1−βS
µ (1− βS) (1− θS)
×
{
[µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ]
(1−βS)(1−θS)
1−βS(1−θS) − [(1− µ) βN ]
(1−βS)(1−θS)
1−βS(1−θS)
}}−1 .
Suppose that firm 1 has a mass point at p¯. Then it distributes prices according to
F1 (p) =
{
1 +
(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
}1− (p
p
) (1−βS)θS+βS
θS

over
[
p, p¯
)
, while firm 2 distributes prices according to
F2 (p) =
[
1 +
(1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS)
][
1−
(
p
p
)βSθS+1−βS
θS
]
.
In equilibrium, the expected prices for the two firms equal each other.
Proof. Suppose that in equilibrium, firm supports have no breaks.13 In equilib-
rium, a firm must be indifferent between any price in its support. Therefore, for
any pi in the support of Fj, E pii
(
p
)
= Epii (pi, Fj (pi)). Then for firm 1, the profit
equality condition is given by
µ {p1 (βSθS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) βNp1 = p [µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ] (2.14)
13See Lemma 2.1 in the appendix. Here we characterize an equilibrium for support type 2. This
analysis subsumes support type 1 as a special case (βS = βN = 1/2 , r1 = r2, Pr (pi = p¯) = 0).
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Differentiating Equation (2.14) with respect to p1 and rearranging gives
µ {(βSθS + 1− βS)F2 (p1) + θSp1F2′ (p1)− βSθS − 1 + βS}
− (1− µ) βN = 0
(2.15)
Solving the differential equation given by Equation (2.15) using the initial value
F2
(
p
)
= 0 gives
F2 (p) =
[
1 +
(1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS)
][
1−
(
p
p
)βSθS+1−βS
θS
]
(2.16)
We can similarly solve for F1 (p) to get
F1 (p) =
{
1 +
(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
}1− (p
p
) (1−βS)θS+βS
θS
 (2.17)
Without loss of generality, suppose that firm 1 is the one with the mass point
at p¯. Setting F2 (p¯) = 1 to solve for p in terms of p¯ gives
p = p¯
[
(1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN
] θS
βSθS+1−βS
(2.18)
Substituting Equation (2.18) into Equation (2.16) gives
F2 (p) =
[
1 +
(1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS)
]
×
[
1− (1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN
(
p¯
p
)βSθS+1−βS
θS
] (2.19)
When r2 ≤ v, p¯ = r2. Optimal search requires that Equation (2.2) holds. Substi-
tuting Equation (2.19) into Equation (2.2) yields[
1 +
(1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS)
]
×
∫ r2
p
[
1− (1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN
(
r2
p
)βSθS+1−βS
θS
]
dp = c
(2.20)
Integrating to solve for r2 in terms of µ, θS, c, βS and βN , we get
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r2 (µ, θS, c, βS, βN)=c
{
1− [(1− µ) βN ]
θS
βSθS+1−βS
µ (1− βS) (1− θS)
×
{
[µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ]
(1−βS)(1−θS)
1−βS(1−θS) (2.21)
− [(1− µ) βN ]
(1−βS)(1−θS)
1−βS(1−θS)
}}−1
By assumption, non-shoppers are indifferent between which firm to sample first.
Since equilibrium support type 2 in Lemma 2.1 implies that p¯ =min {v, r1, r2},
this indifference condition is equivalent to setting the expected prices for the two
firms equal to each other. By doing so, we can solve for βS in terms of βN and the
other parameters. To obtain an expression for the expected price of each firm we
proceed as in Janssen et al. (2005). For firm 2, we solve for p using Equation (2.19)
to get
p = p¯
{
(1− µ) βN
(1− µ) βN + µ (βSθS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p)]
} θS
βSθS+1−βS
(2.22)
Using a change of variables with u = F2 (p), we can write E2 [p] =
∫ 1
0
pdu. Substi-
tuting in p from Equation (2.22) gives
E2 [p] = p¯
∫ 1
0
[
(1− µ) βN
(1− µ) βN + µ (βSθS + 1− βS) (1− u)
] θS
βSθS+1−βS
du (2.23)
Integrating and rearranging yields
E2 [p] =
p¯[(1− µ) βN ]
θS
βSθS+1−βS
µ (1− βS) (1− θS)
×
{
[µ (βSθS + 1− βS)+(1− µ) βN ]
(1−βS)(1−θS)
1−βS(1−θS) −[(1− µ) βN ]
(1−βS)(1−θS)
1−βS(1−θS)
} (2.24)
Proceeding similarly for firm 1, we get
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E1 [p]=p¯
[
1− lim
x→p¯−
F1 (x)
]
+
p¯{µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)}
θS
(1−βS)θS+βS
µβS (1− θS)
×
[
(1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN
] θSβSθS+1−βS
(2.25)
×
{
{µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)}
βS(1−θS)
(1−βS)θS+βS
−
{
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
[
1− lim
x→p¯−
F1 (x)
]
+ (1− µ) (1− βN)
} βS(1−θS)
(1−βS)θS+βS
}
where
lim
x→p¯−
F1 (x) =
{
1 +
(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
}
×
1−
[
(1− µ) βN
µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN
] (1−βS)θS+βS
βSθS+1−βS
 (2.26)
We can now implicitly solve for βS as a function of the remaining parameters using
the equation
E1 [p]− E2 [p] = 0 (2.27)
Equations (2.2) and (2.27) imply that r2 = r1. That is,∫ r2
p
pdF2(p) = lim
x→r2−
∫ x
p
pdF1(p) + p¯
[
1− lim
x→r2−
F1 (x)
]
⇔
∫ r2
p
F2(p)dp =
∫ r2
p
F1(p)dp
(2.28)
The first equation sets the expected prices of the two firms equal to each other.
The second follows from integration by parts.
Define r∗1 and r
∗
2 as the equilibrium reservation prices. If r2 (µ, θS, c, βN) ≤ v,
r∗2 is defined by Equation (2.21). Because firms are not concerned with prices
above v, if r2 (µ, θS, c, βN) > v, we define r
∗
2 as positive infinity. According to
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Equation (2.28), we can set r∗1 = r
∗
2.
Support Type 4. Without loss of generality, suppose that βN is such that
p¯1 = r2 < min {v, r1}= p¯2. Then a complete solution to an equilibrium with
support type 4, if one exists, requires the following set of equations to hold.
E pi1
(
p
)
= Epi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) ⇔ p [µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ]
= µ {p1 (βSθS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p1)]
+ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}+ (1− µ) βNp1
(2.29)
E pi1
(
p
)
= Epi1 (r2, F2 (r2)) ⇔ p [µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ]
= µ {r2 (βSθS + 1− βS) Pr (p2 = p¯2)
+ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < r2]F2 (r2)}+ (1− µ) βNr2
(2.30)
E pi2
(
p
)
= Epi2 (p2, F1 (p2))
⇔ p {µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)} = (1− µ) (1− βN) p2
+µ {p2 [(1− βS) θS+βS] [1−F1 (p2)]+(1− θS) βS E [p1|p1 < p2]F1 (p2)}
(2.31)
E pi2
(
p
)
= Epi2 (p¯2) ⇔ p {µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)}
= µ (1− θS) βS E [p1] + (1− µ) (1− βN) p¯2
(2.32)
∫ r2
p
F1(p)dp+ r1 − r2 = c (2.33)
∫ r2
p
F2(p)dp = c (2.34)
Pr (p1 = r2) = 1− lim
ε→0−
F1 (r2 − ε) ∈ (0, 1) (2.35)
In addition to Equations (2.29) to (2.35), the expected prices of the two firms must
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equal each other to make non-shoppers indifferent between which firm to search
first. Moreover, the inequality, Epi1 (r2, F2 (r2)) > E pi1 (p¯2 − ε, F2 (p¯2 − ε)) must
hold for all ε ∈ (0, p¯2 − r2). That is, firm 1 must not wish to deviate above r2.
We use the following procedure to look for equilibrium. First, we use Equa-
tion (2.29) and (2.31) to solve for F2 and F1 respectively, in terms of p. Plugging
F2 into Equation (2.34) and using Equation (2.30) to solve for p we obtain r2
in terms of Pr (p2 = p¯2). Plugging F1 into Equation (2.35) yields Pr (p1 = r2) in
terms of Pr (p2 = p¯2). Rewriting F1 in terms of Pr (p2 = p¯2) and plugging into
Equation (2.33) yields r1 in terms of Pr (p2 = p¯2). Finally, using Equation (2.32)
to solve for p and setting this equal to the solution obtained from Equation (2.30)
we can rewrite r1 as an alternate function of Pr (p2 = p¯2). Setting the two ex-
pressions for r1 equal to each other, we can now solve for Pr (p2 = p¯2) in terms
of the exogenous parameters. An equilibrium exists only if there is a solution to
Pr (p2 = p¯2) in the interval [0, 1] such that non-shoppers are indifferent between
which firm to search first and firm 1 does not wish to deviate above r2.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that firms are exogenously required to offer price-
matching guarantees and θS = 0. Then there exists a unique Sequential Equilibrium
where both firms set price v and r∗1 = r
∗
2 = v + c.
Proof. We begin by showing that p ≥ min {v, r1, r2}. Suppose conversely that
p < min {v, r1, r2}. At any p1 ∈
(
p, min {v, r1, r2}
)
, firm 1 captures 1 − βS
shoppers, who pay min {p1, p2}, and the same proportion of non-shoppers (βN ,
βN+ (1− γ) (1− βN), or 1 depending on whether firm 2 prices below, at, or above
r1), who pay p1. Thus, firm 1’s profit is increasing in p1, a contradiction.
Claim 2.1 in the proof of Lemma 2.1 still holds. Therefore, v ≥ min {p¯1, p¯2} ≥
51
p≥ min {v, r1, r2}. Moreover, from Equation (2.2) we know that min {r1, r2} >
p, so min {p¯1, p¯2}= v = p. Suppose, without loss of generality, that p¯2 > p¯1. At
any p2 ∈ (p¯1, p¯2], firm 2 expects profit of µβSv. By shifting its mass in (p¯1, p¯2] to
v, firm 2 expects an additional profit of (1− µ) (1− βN) v, a contradiction. Using
a similar argument we can rule out p¯1 > p¯2. Thus, v= p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = p. Since
the unique equilibrium is symmetric and employs pure strategies, we can define
F1 (p) = F2 (p) = F (p) as 0 for p < v and as 1 for p ≥ v. But then, using
Equation (2.2) we get r∗1 = r
∗
2 = v + c.
Lemma 2.2. Suppose that firm 1 is exogenously required to offer price-matching
guarantees while firm 2 is required not to. In equilibrium, the supports of the firm
pricing distributions can only take one of the four following forms:
1. Completely symmetric, no breaks: p
1
=p
2
=p; p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯=min {v, r1 = r2}.
2. Single mass point, no breaks: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm i has a mass point at
p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = min {v, rj}, rj ≤ ri.
3. Two mass points, mutual break: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm j has a mass point at
ri < min {v, rj}; mutual break over (ri, pu) for pu ∈ (ri, p¯); p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ =
min {v, rj}, firm i has a mass point at p¯.
4. Two mass points, single break: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm j has a mass point at
p¯j = ri < min {v, rj}; firm i has a break over (ri, p¯i) for p¯i = min {v, rj}
and a mass point at p¯i.
The following claims complete the proof of Lemma 2.2.
Claim 2.6. v ≥ min {p¯1, p¯2} ≥ p1 = p2 = p ≥ 0.
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Proof. Suppose p
1
< p
2
≤ v. Then, for p1 ∈
[
p
1
, p
2
)
, firm 1’s expected profit is
p1 {µ+ (1− µ) {βN + (1− βN) {[1− F2 (r1)] + (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)}}} (2.36)
which is increasing in p1, contradicting the equilibrium. If p1 ≤ v < p2, for p1 ∈[
p
1
, v
)
, firm 1’s expected profit is given by Expression (2.36), which is increasing
in p1, so it must be the case that p1 = v. But if v = p1 < p2, firm 2 makes no profit
on its support and for sufficiently small ε > 0, it benefits by shifting its mass to
v − ε. Finally, if v < p
1
≤ p
2
, then both firms make zero profits and either can
increase profit by shifting mass to v, so p
2
≤ p
1
. Suppose p
2
< p
1
≤ v. Then, for
p2 ∈
[
p
2
, p
1
)
, firm 2’s expected profit is
p2 {µ [θS + βS (1− θS)]
+ (1− µ) {(1− βN) + βN {[1− F1 (r2)] + (1− γ) Pr (p1 = r2)}}}
(2.37)
(since p
1
< r1 by definition) which is increasing in p2, again contradicting the
equilibrium. If p
2
≤ v < p
1
, for p2 ∈
[
p
2
, v
)
, firm 2’s expected profit is given by
Expression (2.37), which is increasing in p2, so it must be the case that p2 = v.
But if v = p
2
< p
1
, then F1 (v) = 1 (because firm 2 doesn’t make any profit at
prices above v) and firm 1 expects profit of µ (1− βS) (1− θS) v everywhere on
its support. For sufficiently small ε > 0, firm 1 benefits by shifting its mass to
v− ε for expected profit of (v − ε) {µ [θS + (1− βS) (1− θS)] + (1− µ) βS}. Thus,
v ≥ p
1
= p
2
= p. Since prices below zero result in negative profit, p ≥ 0.14
The proof that v ≥ min {p¯1, p¯2} follows similarly to that in Claim 2.1 and is
left to the reader.
Claim 2.7. There are no mutual mass points.
14If p = 0, then there must be zero density at p = 0 because at pi = ε < min {rj , v}, firm i
will make money off its non-shoppers.
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Proof. Suppose that there is a mutual mass point at p. Firm 1’s expected profit at
p when firm 2 charges p as well is given by Expression (2.5). Suppose instead that
firm 1 deviates to p − ε while firm 2 maintains its price at p. Firm 1’s expected
profit will be
(p− ε) {µ+ (1− µ) {βN + (1− βN) [(1− γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}} (2.38)
Expression (2.5) is smaller than Expression (2.38) provided that ε is sufficiently
small.
Suppose firm 2 chooses a price other than p. Lowering the price charged never
reduces the number of sales so the loss to firm 1 from lowering the price by ε
is at most ε. However, when p is charged with positive probability, lowering the
price by ε will with positive probability lead to a gain and with the complementary
probability at worst lead to a loss of ε. Therefore, by shifting its mass point at p to
p−ε for sufficiently small ε firm 1 increases its expected profit, a contradiction.
Claim 2.8. The only possible breaks in the equilibrium supports are:
(i) If p¯i < p¯j, there is a break at (p¯i, p¯j) ∈ Sj.
(ii) If r = ri = rj < p¯i = p¯j, there may be a mutual break with lower bound r.
(iii) If ri 6= rj and firm i has a mass point at rj, there may be a mutual break
with lower bound rj.
Proof. Let S1 and S2 be respectively, the equilibrium supports for firms 1 and 2.
Define H =
(
pd, pu
) ∈ int(S1 ∩ S2).
Suppose first that in equilibrium, firm 2 has no support over H, but that firm
1 does. Firm 1’s expected profit at some p1 ∈ H is
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µ {p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) {p1βN {Ip1<r2 + {γ + (1− γ) [1− F2 (p1)]} Ip1=r2 + [1− F2 (p1)] Ip1>r2}
+ (1− βN) {p1 [1− F2 (r1) + (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)] Ip1<r1 + p1 [1− F2 (r1)] Ip1=r1
+ {p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + r1 (1− θN) (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)
+ (1− θN) E [p2|r1 < p2 < p1] [F2 (p1)− F2 (r1)]} Ip1>r1}} (2.39)
As firm 1 raises p1 along H, its expected profit is increasing since F2 (p1) is constant
along H (and equal to F2 (r1) if r1 ∈ H). Thus, if r2 /∈ H, firm 1 could increase
expected profits by shifting all its mass in H slightly below pu (to pu if firm 2
doesn’t have a mass point there), a contradiction. If r2 ∈ H, firm 1 can increase
expected profits by shifting all mass in
(
pd, r2
)
slightly below r2, and all mass in(
r2, p
d
)
either slightly below r2 or to p
u, again contradicting the equilibrium.
Conversely, suppose that firm 1 has no support over H, but that firm 2 does.
Firm 2’s expected profit at some p2 ∈ H is
µp2 [(1− βS) θS + βS] [1− F1 (p2)] + (1− µ) p2
×{(1− βN) {Ip2<r1 + {γ + θN (1− γ) [1− F1 (p2)]} Ip2=r1
+ θN [1− F1 (p2)] Ip2>r1}
+ βN {[1− F1 (r2) + (1− γ) Pr (p1 = r2)] Ip2<r2
+ [1− F1 (r2)] Ip2=r2 + [1− F1 (p2)] Ip2>r2}}
(2.40)
As firm 2 raises p2 along H, its expected profit is increasing since F1 (p2) is constant
along H (and equal to F1 (r2) if r2 ∈ H). Thus, if r1 /∈ H, firm 2 could increase
expected profits by shifting all its mass in H slightly below pu (to pu if firm 2
doesn’t have a mass point there), a contradiction. If r1 ∈ H, firm 2 can increase
expected profits by shifting all mass in
(
pd, r1
)
slightly below r1, and all mass
in
(
r1, p
d
)
either slightly below r1 or to p
u, again contradicting the equilibrium.
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Thus, any breaks in S1 ∩ S2 are mutual.
The remainder of this proof follows similarly to that in Claim 2.3 and is left to
the reader.
Corollary 2.3. The equilibrium supports are the same except if p¯i = rj < p¯j =
min {v, ri}.
Claim 2.9. Firm i does not have a mass point in the lower bound or the interior
of firm j’s equilibrium support, except possibly at rj.
Proof. The proof to show that firm 2 does not have a mass point at p ∈ S1\ {p¯1}
proceeds precisely as that in Claim 2.4 and is omitted. Suppose instead that firm
1 has a mass point at p ∈ S2\ {p¯2} and that p 6= r2. Firm 2’s expected profit at
p− ε when firm 1 charges p is
(p− ε) {µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ)
×{(1− βN) [Ip−ε<r1 + [γ + θN (1− γ)] Ip−ε=r1 + θNIp−ε>r1 ]
+ βN [(1− γ) Ip=r2 + Ip>r2 ]}}
(2.41)
whereas its expected profit at p+ ε is
(1− µ) (p+ ε) (1− βN) (Ip+ε<r1 + γIp+ε=r1) (2.42)
Expression (2.42) is smaller than Expression (2.41) provided that ε is sufficiently
small. Suppose firm 1 chooses a price other than p. Lowering the price charged
never reduces the number of sales so the loss to firm 2 from lowering the price by
2ε or less is at most 2ε. However, when p is charged with positive probability,
lowering the price by 2ε or less will with positive probability lead to a gain and
with the complementary probability at worst lead to a loss of 2ε. Therefore, by
shifting its mass between p and p+ε to p−ε for sufficiently small ε, firm 2 increases
its expected profit, a contradiction.
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Claim 2.10. If p¯ = p¯1 = p¯2 then either
(i) p¯ = min {v, r1, r2}, the supports have no breaks, and at most one firm can
have a mass point at p¯, or
(ii) p¯ = min {v, max {r1, r2}}, there is a mutual break above min {r1, r2} < p¯,
firm i has a mass point at rj, and firm j has a mass point at p¯.
Proof. Suppose that p¯ = p¯1 = p¯2 and neither firm has a mass point at p¯. From
Claims 2.6 and 2.9 we know that p < p¯ ≤ v. Suppose that p¯ < min {v, r2}. At
p1 ∈ [p¯, min {v, r2}), firm 1’s expected profit is
µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2]
+ (1− µ) {βNp1 + (1− θN) (1− βN) {E [p2|r1 < p2] [1− F2 (r1)]
+ r1 (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)}}
(2.43)
which is increasing in p1 when βN 6= 0, a contradiction. Suppose instead that p¯ >
min {v, r2}= r2. For any p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), in equilibrium, Epi1 (p¯)= Epi1 (p1, F2 (p1)).
E pi1 (p¯) equals
µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2]
+ (1− µ) (1− θN) (1− βN) {E [p2|r1 < p2] [1− F2 (r1)]
+ r1 (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)}
(2.44)
If r2 ≥ r1, for p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) equals
µ {p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) {p1βN [1− F2 (p1)] +(1− βN) {r1 (1− θN) (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)
+ p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θN) E [p2|r1 < p2 < p1] [F2 (p1)− F2 (r1)]}}
(2.45)
Setting Expression (2.44) equal to Expression (2.45) and differentiating with re-
spect to p1 gives us
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1−F2 (p1)−[µ (θS + βS − θSβS)+(1− µ) (θN + βN − θNβN)] p1F2′ (p1)=0 (2.46)
Solving the differential equation given by Equation (2.46) using the initial value
F2 (p¯) = 1 gives us F2 (p1) = 1 for all p1 ∈ (r2, p¯], a contradiction. Similarly, if
r1 ∈ (r2, p¯), then Expression (2.45) represents firm 1’s expected profit at (r1, p¯)
and F2 (p1) = 1 for all p1 ∈ (r1, p¯], a contradiction. If on the other hand, r1 ≥ p¯,
E pi1 (p¯) becomes µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2] while Epi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) at p1 ∈ (r2, p¯)
becomes
µ {p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) βNp1 [1− F2 (p1)]
(2.47)
Setting µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2] equal to Expression (2.47) and solving the result-
ing differential equation using the initial value F2 (p¯) = 1 again gives us F2 (p1) = 1
for all p1 ∈ (r2, p¯], a contradiction. Hence, for βN 6= 0, p¯ = min {v, r2}. Now
suppose that p¯ < min {v, r1}. At p2 ∈[p¯, min {v, r1}), firm 2’s expected profit
is (1− µ) (1− βN) p2, which is increasing in p2 when βN 6= 1, a contradiction.
Suppose instead, that p¯ > min {v, r1}. But then, at p¯, firm 2 expects no profit, a
contradiction. Thus, p¯ = min {v, r1}, so when neither firm has a mass point at p¯,
p¯ = min {v, r1, r2}.
From Claim 2.7, we know that at most one firm can have a mass point at p¯,
say firm j. If γ = 1 or v < ri, then following the argument in the paragraph
above, p¯ = min {v, ri}. Otherwise, firm j cannot have a mass point at p¯ (using
reasoning similar to that in the proof of Claim 2.8). Moreover, if rj ≥ ri, then
p¯ = min {v, r1, r2} and from Claim 2.8, we know that the firm supports have no
breaks. Conversely, suppose rj < ri (and therefore, rj < v). First, let i = 1. From
Claim 2.9, we know that firm 2 cannot have a mass point at r2. At r2, firm 1
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expects profit of
µ {r2 [1− F2 (r2)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < r2]F2 (r2)}+ (1− µ) βNr2 (2.48)
whereas at p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) is given by Expression (2.47). By def-
inition, for p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), 0 < F2 (r2) ≤ F2 (p1), so for p1 close enough to r2,
Expression (2.48) is strictly greater than Expression (2.47). Therefore, r2 must be
the lower bound for a break in S1 and we are in Case (iii) of Claim 2.8. Now let
j = 1. From Claim 2.9, we know that firm 1 cannot have a mass point at r1. At
r1, firm 2 expects profit of
r1 {µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] [1− F1 (r1)] + (1− µ) (1− βN)} (2.49)
whereas at p2 ∈ (r1, p¯), E pi2 (p2, F1 (p2)) is given by
p2 {µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN) θN} [1− F1 (p2)] (2.50)
By definition, for p2 ∈ (r1, p¯), 0 < F1 (r1) ≤ F1 (p2), so for p2 close enough to r1,
Expression (2.49) is strictly greater than Expression (2.50). Therefore, r1 must be
the lower bound for a break in S2 and we are again in Case (iii) of Claim 2.8.
Notice that Claim 2.10 rules out Case (ii) in Claim 2.8.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that firm 1 is exogenously required to offer price-
matching guarantees while firm 2 is required not to. Then there exists a set of
Sequential Equilibria where both firms distribute prices over support[
p = min {v, r∗}
{
(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)
}
, p¯ = min {v, r∗}
]
and the equilibrium reservation price, r∗ = r∗1 = r
∗
2 equals
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r∗ =
r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) if r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) ≤ v∞ otherwise ,
r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN)=c
{
1− (1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
× ln
{
1 +
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
(1− µ) (1− βN)
}}−1
.
Firm 1 distributes prices according to
F1 (p) =
{
1 +
(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
}(
1− p
p
)
,
while firm 2 distributes prices according to
F2 (p) =
[
1 +
(1− µ) βN
µ
][
1−
(
p
p
) 1
βS+θS−βSθS
]
over
[
p, p¯
)
with a mass point at p¯. In equilibrium, the expected prices for the two
firms equal each other.
Proof. The proof of this proposition follows very similarly to that of Proposi-
tion 2.1. As such, below we will only write down equations for the equilibrium
firm distribution functions, the lower bound of firm supports, the reservation price
when it is the upper bound (when it is no greater than v), and firms’ expected
prices.
Suppose that firm supports are represented by case 2 in Lemma 2.2. Then firm
1’s distribution function is
F1 (p) =
{
1 +
(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
}(
1− p
p
)
(2.51)
and firm 2’s distribution function is
F2 (p) =
[
1 +
(1− µ) βN
µ
][
1−
(
p
p
) 1
βS+θS−βSθS
]
(2.52)
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The lower bound, p, is
p = p¯
{
(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)
}
(2.53)
When r1 ≤ v, p¯ = r1 is given by
r1 (µ, θS, c, βS, βN)
= c
{
1− (1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] ln
{
1 +
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
(1− µ) (1− βN)
}}−1 (2.54)
Firm 1’s expected price is
E1 [p] =
p¯ (1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] ln
{
1 +
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
(1− µ) (1− βN)
}
(2.55)
Firm 2’s expected price is
E2 [p] = p¯
[
1− lim
x→p¯−
F2 (x)
]
+p¯
{
(1−µ) (1−βN)
µ [(1−βS) θS+βS]+(1−µ) (1−βN)
}
[µ+ (1− µ) βN ]βS+θS−βSθS
µ (1 + βSθS − θS − βS)
×
{
[µ+ (1− µ) βN ]1+βSθS−θS−βS
−
{
µ
[
1− lim
x→p¯−
F2 (x)
]
+ (1− µ) βN
}1+βSθS−θS−βS}
(2.56)
where
lim
x→p¯−
F2 (x) =
[
1 +
(1− µ) βN
µ
]
×
{
1−
{
(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)
} 1
βS+θS−βSθS
} (2.57)
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Chapter 3
Asymmetric Sequential Search
3.1 Introduction
There is a rich literature examining how costly price search by consumers leads
to price dispersion in homogeneous goods markets (Burdett and Judd 1983; Stahl
1989; Janssen et al. 2005). Because the consumer search order is usually assumed
to be random, all firms expect to be visited by the same types of consumers in equal
proportion and all firms have the same price distribution in equilibrium. However,
there are many markets where different firms expect to encounter different types
of consumers. For instance, while supermarkets serve various types of buyers,
higher pricing convenience stores sell many of the same goods primarily to one
type: individuals with a high opportunity cost of shopping elsewhere. Similarly,
low price outlets may provide consumers with the same products sold by general
retailers, but since they are located far from residential areas they mainly cater
to consumers with a low opportunity cost of searching.1 In this paper, we are
1For empirical evidence, see Chung and Myers 1999; Hausman and Leibtag 2007; Griffith et
al. 2009.
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interested in analyzing how such demand asymmetries affect prices and welfare
when consumers engage in sequential price search.
In our model, two firms compete by setting prices for a homogeneous good.
There are two types of consumers in the market. Fully informed consumers (re-
ferred to as shoppers) have no opportunity cost of time and observe both prices
at no cost,2 whereas non-shoppers engage in optimal sequential search. When
searching sequentially, a consumer with a price at hand continues searching only
as long as the marginal benefit of doing so is higher than the constant marginal
cost. We adjust the commonly used assumption that the first price sample is free
for all consumers by supposing that non-shoppers can only obtain the first price
for free at their local firm. When one of the two firms that comprise the market
has a larger local population than the other, a symmetric equilibrium no longer
exists. That is, the equilibrium price distributions for the two firms differ.
We characterize the unique equilibrium of this game and provide several com-
parative statics. In equilibrium, firms randomize over lower prices to attract shop-
pers, and over higher prices to realize greater profits from local non-shoppers, who
end up not searching. The equilibrium price distribution of the firm with the
larger local population first order stochastically dominates that of the other firm,
and as a result, the firm with the larger local population will have higher prices
on average. This is because the firm with the larger local population loses more
profit from non-shoppers when it lowers its price. Since both firms have the same
equilibrium support, the firm with the larger local population also has an atom
2Interpretations of shoppers in the literature are as individuals who read sales ads (Varian
1980), as consumers who derive enjoyment from shopping (Stahl 1989), as a coalition of consumers
who freely share their search information (Stahl 1996), and as users of search engines (Janssen
and Non 2008).
63
at the upper bound of the distribution. This is interpreted to mean that it is less
likely to run a sale. Moreover, the firm’s propensity to run a sale decreases as the
share of the total population that is local to it increases. Interestingly, both firms
will continue to run sales with positive probability even when all non-shoppers are
local to one firm because this firm still has an incentive to try to capture shoppers.
It turns out that the likelihood of a sale does not have to increase in the
proportion of shoppers. As this proportion increases, firms tend to run better
sales, but the frequency of sales can increase or decrease depending on how local
non-shoppers in the two firms are affected. Both firms are clearly motivated to run
better sales to attract the new shoppers in the population. However, where these
new shoppers are coming from affects the frequency of sales. For instance, suppose
that firm 1 has more local non-shoppers than firm 2 and that the growing number
of shoppers comes primarily out of the population of non-shoppers local to firm 2.
To compensate for the better sales that it runs to attract the new shoppers, firm 1
exploits its local non-shoppers by running sales less often. Nevertheless, in terms
of consumer welfare, the effect of better sales always dominates.
In most models of sequential search (Stahl 1989, 1996; Janssen et al. 2005),
heterogeneous consumers sample firm prices at random, so changes in the compo-
sition of consumers affect all firms in the same way. It is by biasing the sampling
behavior of some of these consumers to favor a particular firm that we are able
to examine the impact of demand differences on firm pricing. Arbatskaya (2007)
examines an ordered search model where consumers with heterogeneous search
costs all face the same search order. In her pure strategy equilibrium, firms at
the bottom of the search order always have lower prices than those at the top.
On the other hand, Armstrong et al. (2009) analyze a model where consumers
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with different tastes all search a prominent firm first, but find that the prominent
firm has a lower price than the rest. Reinganum’s (1979) model addresses the op-
posite question: it asks how firm cost heterogeneity affects price dispersion when
all consumers are homogeneous. The papers that come closest to addressing our
research question are Narasimhan (1988) and Jing and Wen (2008), which consider
a market with shoppers and non-shoppers who decide where to buy according to
an exogenous rule. In Narasimhan, a proportion of non-shoppers is only allowed to
buy from one firm while the rest must purchase from the other firm. In Jing and
Wen all non-shoppers purchase from the same firm unless the other firm under-
prices it by an exogenously determined amount. By endogenizing the purchasing
decision, we are able to show how changes in the proportion of shoppers or the level
of asymmetry affect non-shoppers’ search strategies and firm pricing behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
model. Section 3.3 develops the equilibrium and Section 3.4 explores the com-
parative statics. Section 3.5 concludes and details directions for future research.
Section 3.6 consists of appendices containing formal proofs.
3.2 The model
Two firms, labeled 1 and 2, sell a homogeneous good. Firms have no capacity
constraints and an identical constant cost of zero of producing one unit of the
good.3 There is a unit mass of almost identical consumers with inelastic (unit)
demand and valuation v > 0 for the good. A proportion σ ∈ (0, 1) of consumers
have 0 cost of search, and will be referred to as shoppers. The remaining 1 − σ
3The price of the good can be viewed as a price cost margin.
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consumers, called non-shoppers, pay a positive search cost c ∈ (0, v) for each
firm they visit except for their local firm, which they search first. A fraction
λ ∈ [0, 1−σ] of all non-shoppers are local to firm 1, while the remaining 1−σ−λ
are local to firm 2. Non-shoppers search sequentially. Upon observing the price at
their local firm, they must decide whether to search the second one. We assume
costless recall—that is, consumers who have observed both prices can freely choose
to purchase the good at the lower price.
Firms and consumers play the following game. First, firms 1 and 2 simulta-
neously choose prices taking into consideration their beliefs about the rival firm’s
pricing strategy and about consumer search behavior. A pricing strategy consists
of a price distribution Fi over [pi, p¯i], where Fi(p) represents the probability that
firm i = 1, 2 offers a price no higher than p. After firms choose price distribu-
tions, prices are realized. Shoppers observe the price realizations of both firms
and choose where to buy the product. Non-shoppers local to firm i only observe
firm i’s price realization. Given their information and beliefs about firm j’s price
distribution, non-shoppers choose a search strategy that specifies whether or not
to search the non-local firm, whether or not to buy the product, and where to buy
it (in case both firm price realizations are observed). Parameters v, c, σ, λ, as well
as the rationality of all agents in the model are commonly known.
3.3 Equilibrium analysis
The equilibrium concept that we use is Sequential Equilibrium.4 In this context,
Sequential Equilibrium requires that non-shoppers who observe an off-equilibrium
4For an extension of the definition of sequential equilibrium to infinite action games, see
Manelli (1996).
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price at their local firm treat such deviations as mistakes when forming beliefs
about the non-local firm’s strategy. Thus, non-shoppers believe that the non-local
firm plays its equilibrium strategy at all information sets.
3.3.1 Consumer behavior
The marginal benefit of searching firm j for a non-shopper local to firm i after
having observed a price of pλ at firm i is given by∫ pλ
p
j
(pλ − p)dFj(p) (3.1)
Expression (3.1) denotes the non-shopper’s expected surplus from searching firm
j. After searching firm j, the non-shopper will purchase at the lower of pλ and
the price observed at firm j. Thus, the marginal benefit of search arises from the
opportunity to find a price lower than pλ at firm j.
After integration by parts, Expression (3.1) becomes∫ pλ
p
j
Fj(p)dp (3.2)
A non-shopper will benefit from searching his non-local firm if and only if Expres-
sion (3.2) is no less than his cost of search c. That is,∫ pλ
p
j
Fj(p)dp ≥ c (3.3)
The optimal strategy for a non-shopper local to firm i is to search firm j if and
only if the price realization at his local firm is greater than some reservation price,
denoted rj. In subsection 3.3.3 we will show that the equilibrium reservation price
is the mapping that gives the value of pλ that makes Expression (3.3) hold with
equality when such a pλ exists and is less than or equal to v.
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3.3.2 Firm pricing
Before characterizing the equilibrium of the game, we will narrow down the possible
sets of prices that firms can charge.
Proposition 3.1. In equilibrium, the firm supports can only take one of the four
following forms:
1. Completely symmetric, no breaks: p
1
= p
2
= p; p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = min{v, r1 =
r2}.
2. Single atom, no breaks: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm i has an atom at p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ =
min{v, rj}, rj ≤ ri.
3. Two atoms, mutual break: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm j has an atom at ri <
min{v, rj}; mutual break over (ri, pu) for pu ∈ (ri, p¯); p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ =
min{v, rj}, firm i has an atom at p¯.
4. Two atoms, single break: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm j has an atom at p¯j = ri <
min{v, rj}; firm i has a break over (ri, p¯i) for p¯i = min{v, rj} and an atom
at p¯i.
The proof of this proposition is contained in the appendix. Notice that in
every case firms never price higher than v, so there is always complete consumer
participation in the market. The completely symmetric case in Proposition 3.1
occurs if and only if λ = (1 − σ)/2, that is, if both firms have the same fraction
of local non-shoppers. As such, it is a special case of support type 2. In support
type 2, because firms never price above the smaller of the two reservation prices,
non-shoppers never search in equilibrium. Support type 3 is the only one where
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some non-shoppers may search beyond their local firm, while support type 4 is the
only case where the firm supports are not the same. However, in Proposition 3.2
we show that the last two support types cannot occur in equilibrium.
The corollary below is a technical result needed for existence of equilibrium. It
follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 3.1. It states that when non-
shoppers are indifferent between staying at their local firm and searching, whenever
the upper bound of the firm supports is lower than v, they must stay in order for
equilibrium to exist.
Corollary 3.1. For equilibria with support types 2, 3 or 4 in Proposition 3.1 to
exist, all non-shoppers must stop searching after observing a price of rj at local
firm i,5 unless v < rj.
3.3.3 Equilibrium
Let ρj(σ, λ, c) be the mapping that gives the value of pλ that makes Expression
(3.3) hold with equality. From Proposition 3.1, we know that there are no atoms
at the lower bound of the support of firm price distributions. Since Expression
(3.2) is increasing in p, we know that such a value of pλ exists and that it is unique.
Going forward, we will consider only the case λ ∈ ((1−σ)/2, 1−σ], so that firm
1 will always be treated as the one with more local non-shoppers. The following
proposition completely describes the unique Sequential Equilibrium of this game
for this case. The case λ ∈ [0, (1 − σ)/2) follows analogously and we leave it to
the reader.
Proposition 3.2. There exists a unique Sequential Equilibrium where both firms
5This means γ = 1 in the proof of Proposition 3.1.
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have supports
[
p, p¯
]
, where p¯ = min{v, r∗2} and p = λλ+σ p¯, and r∗1 and r∗2 are the
equilibrium reservation prices for non-shoppers local to firm 2 and firm 1 respec-
tively. r∗1 =∞,
r∗2 =
 ρ2(σ, λ, c) = c
[
1− λ
σ
ln
(
σ+λ
λ
)]−1
if ρ2(σ, λ, c) ≤ v
∞ otherwise
Firm 1 distributes prices according to
F1(p) =

1−λ
σ
[
1− p/p] p ≤ p < p¯
1 p = p¯
with Pr [p1 = p¯] =
2λ+σ−1
σ+λ
, and firm 2 distributes prices according to F2(p) =
σ+λ
σ
[
1− p/p].
Proof. We prove existence by directly computing and characterizing the equilib-
rium. A sketch of the proof of uniqueness is included in the appendix, where we
rule out support types (3) and (4) in Proposition 3.1.
In equilibrium, a firm must be indifferent between any price in its support.
Therefore, for any p1 in the support of F2, EΠ1(p) = EΠ1(p1, F2(p1)). Given that
the unique equilibrium has support type (2),6
p(σ + λ) = p1{σ[1− F2(p1)] + λ} (3.4)
We can solve for F2(p) to get
F2(p) =
σ + λ
σ
(
1− p/p) (3.5)
Similarly, setting EΠ2(p) = EΠ2(p2, F1(p2)), it is easy to show that
F1(p) =
1− λ
σ
(
1− p/p) (3.6)
6Support type (2) subsumes support type (1) as the special case (λ = (1 − σ)/2, r∗1 =
r∗2 , Pr(pi = p¯) = 0).
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Since λ > 1−σ
2
, F1 first order stochastically dominates F2. Because p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯,
this implies an atom at firm 1’s upper bound.
Setting F2(p¯) = 1, we can solve for p in terms of p¯ and substitute it into F2(p),
which becomes
F2(p) =
σ + λ
σ
(
1− λ
σ + λ
p¯
p
)
(3.7)
When ρ2(σ, λ, c) ≤ v, p¯ = ρ2(σ, λ, c). Optimal search requires that Expression
(3.3) holds with equality. Substituting in Equation (3.7) yields∫ ρ2
p
σ + λ
σ
(
1− λ
σ + λ
ρ2
p
)
dp = c (3.8)
Finally, integrating and solving for ρ2, we get
ρ2(σ, λ, c) = c
[
1− λ
σ
ln
(
σ + λ
λ
)]−1
(3.9)
If ρ2(σ, λ, c) ≤ v, r∗2 is defined by Equation (3.9). Because firms are not concerned
with prices above v, if ρ2(σ, λ, c) > v, we define r
∗
2 as positive infinity. Since
F1(p) < F2(p), ρ1(σ, λ, c) > min{v, ρ2(σ, λ, c)}, and we can define r∗1 as positive
infinity.
In the equilibrium described above, all non-shoppers search their local firm and
make a purchase there, whereas all shoppers purchase from the firm with the lower
price. Since non-shoppers always buy from their local firm, it is more costly for
firm 1 to lower its price than it is for firm 2. Firm 1 takes advantage of its location
by running fewer sales and pricing higher on average.
Proposition 3.2 immediately gives rise to the following result.
Corollary 3.2. For λ ≥ 1−σ
2
, ρ2(σ, λ, c) is decreasing in σ and increasing in λ.
Corollary 3.2 tells us that as long as r∗2 ≤ v, the bounds of the firm price
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distributions fall in the proportion of shoppers and rise as the firm with more local
non-shoppers gains market power relative to the other firm.
3.4 Comparative statics
In this section we explore how changes in λ and σ affect firm price distributions
in more depth. All proofs will be contained in the appendix.
3.4.1 Changes in the proportion of locals at firm 1
Proposition 3.3. For σ ∈ (0, 1),
(i) As λ increases over [1−σ
2
, 1 − σ], the probability that firm 1 runs a sale de-
creases. Even when λ = 1− σ, price dispersion persists.
(ii) Let 1−σ
2
< λ < λ¯ < 1 − σ. Then for both firms, the price distribution
contitional on λ¯ first order stochastically dominates the price distribution
conditional on λ.
As λ increases, the atom at p1 = p¯ increases in size, but equals 1 − σ when
λ = 1− σ. Hence, there is always price dispersion in equilibrium (there is no pure
strategy equilibrium). This results because σ ∈ (0, 1) and both firms run sales
to attract shoppers. The second part of Proposition 3.3 says that as firm 1 gains
market power relative to firm 2, not only do the bounds on firm price distributions
increase (as implied by Corollary 3.2), but also both distributions shift in a first
order stochastic dominant sense. This is not completely straightforward for firm 2
because as λ increases there are two countervailing forces acting on its prices. On
the one hand, when firm 2 has fewer locals, it has more incentive to lower prices
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to lure shoppers. On the other, because of the shift in firm 1’s distribution, firm 2
no longer needs to lower prices as much to have the same probability of capturing
all the shoppers as it did with a lower λ. Proposition 3.3 tells us that the latter
effect dominates. The proof is included in the appendix.
3.4.2 Changes in the proportion of shoppers
When λ increases, by definition, firm one obtains a higher proportion of local non-
shoppers. In contrast, when σ changes, it is not clear which firm(s) loses or gains
local non-shoppers. For example, if σ increases there may be a fall in the number
of local non-shoppers in firm 2 without any change in the number of non-shoppers
local to firm 1. However, the fact that σ + λ ≤ 1 imposes a constraint on how
much σ can increase without affecting λ. As a result, when evaluating changes in
σ, λ must be treated as a function of σ, ϕ(σ) with derivative dϕ(σ)/dσ ∈ [−1, 0].
dϕ(σ)/dσ = 0 means that as σ increases, only firm 2 loses local non-shoppers,
dϕ(σ)/dσ = −1 means that as σ increases, only firm 1 loses local non shoppers,
and otherwise, both firms lose local non-shoppers as σ increases.
Proposition 3.4. The probability that firm 1 runs a sale and both firm price
distributions depend on σ and the size of dϕ(σ)/dσ = λ
′
as follows.
(i) For λ
′
sufficiently close to zero, the atom increases in σ, and firm 1’s price
distribution increases in σ for lower prices, and decreases in σ for higher
prices.
(ii) For λ
′
sufficiently close to −1, the atom decreases in σ, and firm 1’s price
distribution for a lower value of σ first order stochastically dominates that
for a higher value of σ.
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(iii) Firm 2’s price distribution for a lower value of σ first order stochastically
dominates that for a higher value of σ always.
According to Proposition 3.4, as the proportion of shoppers increases, both
firms have incentives to run better sales to attract the new shoppers. That is,
both firm price distributions will put more mass on lower prices. However, firm 1’s
atom at p¯ may increase or decrease depending on which firm is losing more local
non-shoppers. This can be interpreted respectively as a decrease or an increase
in the frequency of sales run by firm 1. Suppose that that the new shoppers
come primarily out of the population of non-shoppers local to firm 2. Firm 1 can
compensate itself for the better sales that it runs to attract the new shoppers by
pricing at p¯ with higher probability because it still maintains its fraction of locals
relative to the entire population of consumers (λ is constant). If, instead, firm 1’s
local non-shoppers are the ones becoming shoppers, then firm 1 will run more sales
and have higher discounts because λ is decreasing.
3.4.3 Welfare implications
The welfare implications of Proposition 3.3 are straightforward. That is, expected
welfare is decreasing in λ because when λ is higher there are fewer sales and those
that are run tend to be worse. On the contrary, expected welfare is increasing in
σ. When λ
′
is sufficiently close to −1, this is clear because there are more sales
and those that are run tend to be better. However, when λ
′
is sufficiently close
to zero, the welfare implications are not obvious because, while there are fewer
sales, those that are run tend to be better. To show that expected welfare is still
increasing in σ in this case, we define expected welfare, W , as follows:
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W = (v − E1[p])λ+ (v − E2[p])(1− λ) (3.10)
where Ei denotes the expected price under distribution Fi. Since firm 1 has a
higher expected price in equilibrium, only its λ local non-shoppers are expected
to purchase from it, while all other consumers are expected to buy from firm 2. It
is easy to show that W increases in σ, so that the positive effect from better sales
dominates the negative effect from the decline in the number of sales.
3.4.4 Limiting cases
Before concluding, we would like to explore the limiting cases when either all
consumers are shoppers or all are non-shoppers. We start by looking at the case
when σ approaches 1. From Corollary 3.2, we know that for sufficiently high σ,
ρ2(σ, λ, c) is strictly lower than v. In addition, for any value of λ, when σ becomes
large enough, λ = 1 − σ. Thus, the equilibrium reservation price r∗2 becomes the
following expression:
c
[
1 +
1− σ
σ
ln (1− σ)
]−1
(3.11)
As σ → 1, Expression (3.11) approaches c and p → 0. As a consequence,
Proposition 3.4 implies that as σ → 1, the equilibrium firm price distributions
collapse to a degenerate distribution at zero. Therefore, in the limit, the effects of
location disappear and we are back to Stahl’s (1989) result that when all consumers
are shoppers, the unique Nash equilibrium is the competitive price.
The case when σ approaches 0 is not as clear cut as the previous one. The
results differ depending on the value of λ. For a given value of λ ∈ [1−σ
2
, 1 − σ),
as σ → 0, ρ2(σ, λ, c) → ∞, so that for sufficiently low σ, p¯ = v. Moreover, as
σ → 0, p → p¯. Therefore, in the limit, when all consumers are non-shoppers, the
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entire distribution collapses to v. However, when σ = 0 and λ = 1, then to the
contrary, the monopolistic outcome may not occur. The results of this subsection
are summarized in Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5.
(i) When σ = 1, the unique equilibrium is p1 = p2 = 0.
(ii) When σ = 0 and λ ∈ [0.5, 1), the unique equilibrium is p1 = p2 = v, r∗1 =
r∗2 =∞, and consumers purchase from their local firm.
(iii) When σ = 0 and λ = 1, the set of pure strategy equilibria7 can be character-
ized as follows: p1 ∈ [0, v]. If p1 ∈ [0, v), p2 = p1 − c, r∗2 = p1 = p2 + c < v.
If p1 = v, p2 ∈ [v − c,∞), and r∗2 = min{v,∞}.
Part (ii) of Proposition 3.5 states that Stahl’s (1989) result persists even after
accounting for location asymmetries. That is, when all consumers are non-shoppers
and both firms have locals, the monopolistic outcome is the unique equilibrium of
the game.
However, when λ = 1, there are multiple pure strategy equilibria where firm
2 underprices firm 1 by c. In such equilibria, since non-shoppers do not search,
firm 1 would like to charge v. However, since λ = 1, firm 2 makes zero profit, so
it can charge any price. By charging prices lower than v − c, firm 2 increases the
marginal benefit of searching, causing r∗2 to drop below v. In order to keep its local
non-shoppers from searching firm 2, firm 1 has to lower its price below v. This is
contrary to what happens in Proposition 3.3 where σ ∈ (0, 1) and a higher λ is
associated with increasing prices.
7In this case there is no completely mixed strategy equilibrium. Firm 1 will always play a
pure strategy in equilibrium. Even though firm 2 can play a mixed strategy in equilibrium, this
does not matter to consumers because they never observe its price.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the consequences of introducing a location asymme-
try into a duopoly version of Stahl’s (1989) seminal model of sequential consumer
search. Contrary to Stahl, where all consumers can sample the first price for free
at any firm, non-shoppers in our model can only obtain the first price quote for free
at their local firm. When firms serve different proportions of local non-shoppers,
Stahl’s symmetric equilibrium can no longer exist. In this case, the price distri-
bution of the firm with more locals (and hence, greater market power) first order
stochastically dominates that of the other firm and the firm with more locals no
longer runs sales all the time (as in symmetric models).
We have analyzed the following comparative statics results in this equilibrium.
First, as the market power of the firm with more locals grows, it runs fewer sales
and tends to offer smaller discounts in the sales it does run. Second, as the
proportion of shoppers in the economy rises, this firm offers greater discounts on
the sales it runs. However, it may run more or fewer sales depending on which
firm is losing local non-shoppers.
A natural direction for future research is to assume that non-shoppers have a
cost of recalling the first price after having searched the second firm. This has
not been modeled in an asymmetric framework and we are particularly interested
to learn how this feature will influence non-shopper search behavior. Another
possible extension is the N firm analogue of this paper. With more than two firms
reservation prices are no longer stationary and all consumers must determine an
optimal sampling order for firms beyond their local one.
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3.6 Appendices
3.6.1 Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proposition 3.1. In equilibrium, the firm supports can only take one of the four
following forms:
1. Completely symmetric, no breaks: p
1
= p
2
= p; p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = min{v, r1 =
r2}.
2. Single atom, no breaks: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm i has an atom at p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ =
min{v, rj}, rj ≤ ri.
3. Two atoms, mutual break: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm j has an atom at ri <
min{v, rj}; mutual break over (ri, pu) for pu ∈ (ri, p¯); p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ =
min{v, rj}, firm i has an atom at p¯.
4. Two atoms, single break: p
1
= p
2
= p; firm j has an atom at p¯j = ri <
min{v, rj}; firm i has a break over (ri, p¯i) for p¯i = min{v, rj} and an atom
at p¯i.
The following claims complete the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Claim 3.1. v ≥ max{p¯1, p¯2} ≥ p1 = p2 = p ≥ 0.
Proof. Let γ be the proportion of non-shoppers who do not search after observing
a price of rj at their local firm i. Suppose p1 < p2 ≤ v. Firm 1’s profit on [p1, p2)
equals
p1{σ + λ+ (1− σ − λ)[1− F2(r1) + (1− γ) Pr(p2 = r1)]} (3.12)
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which is increasing in p1, a contradiction. Now suppose that p1 ≤ v < p2. Then
for p1 ∈ [p1, v), firm 1’s profit is given by Equation (3.12), which is increasing in
p1, so it must be the case that p1 = v. If p1 = v < p2, then firm 2 makes zero profit
on its support, and would increase profits by shifting mass to v. If v < p
1
≤ p
2
,
then both firms make zero profits and either can increase profit by shifting mass
to v, so p
2
≤ p
1
. By a similar argument, p
2
≥ p
1
and v ≥ p
1
= p
2
= p.
Firms will not charge prices below zero because these yield negative profit.8
Similarly, at prices above v firms make zero profit. As a result, all consumers in
the market make a purchase.
Definition 3.1. We say that firms have a mutual atom when each firm has an
atom at the same price. We say that firms have a mutual break when each firm’s
equilibrium support has a break over the same price interval.
Claim 3.2. There are no mutual atoms.
Proof. Let αS be the proportion of shoppers who buy from firm 1 after having
observed the same price in both firms. Let αN be the proportion of non-shoppers
who buy from their local firm after having observed the same price in both firms.
Suppose that both firms have a mutual atom at p. When p1 = p2 = p, firm 1’s
profit is given by
p{αSσ + λ[Ip<r2 + [γ + αN(1− γ)]Ip=r2 + αNIp>r2 ]
+ (1− σ − λ)(1− αN)[(1− γ)Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}
(3.13)
where I is an indicator function. Suppose that firm 1 sets p1 = p− ε instead of p.
Then profits become
(p− ε){σ + λ+ (1− σ − λ)[(1− γ)Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]} (3.14)
8If p = 0, then there must be zero density at p = 0.
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Expression (3.14) is larger than Expression (3.13) when
ε <
p{σ(1−αS)+λ(1−αN )[(1−γ)Ip=r2+Ip>r2 ]+(1−σ−λ)αN [(1−γ)Ip=r1+Ip>r1 ]}
σ+λ+(1−σ−λ)[(1−γ)Ip=r1+Ip>r1 ]
Suppose firm 2 chooses a price other than p. Lowering the price charged never
reduces the number of sales, so the loss to firm 1 from lowering the price by ε
is at most ε. However, when p is charged with positive probability, lowering the
price by ε will with positive probability lead to a gain and with complementary
probability, at worst lead to a loss of ε. Therefore, by shifting its atom at p to
p − ε for sufficiently small ε, firm 1 increases its expected profit, a contradiction.
By a similar argument, firm 2 will want to undercut a mutual atom for λ 6= 1− σ.
For the case 1−αS = αN = λ = 0, firm 1 does not have a profitable deviation,
but firm 2 does.
Claim 3.3. The only possible breaks in the equilibrium supports are:
(i) if p¯i < p¯j there is a break at (p¯i, p¯j) ∈ Sj
(ii) if r = ri = rj < p¯i = p¯j there may be a mutual break with lower bound r, and
(iii) if ri 6= rj and firm i has an atom at rj, there may be a mutual break with
lower bound rj.
Proof. Let S1 and S2 denote the equilibrium supports for firms 1 and 2 respectively.
Let pˆ = inf(S1 ∩ S2) and ˆˆp = sup(S1 ∩ S2). Define H = (pd, pu) ∈ int(S1 ∩ S2).
Suppose first, without loss of generality, that in equilibrium, firm 2 has no
support over H, but that firm 1 does. Firm 1’s expected profit at p1 ∈ H is
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p1{ σ[1− F2(p1)]
+ λ{Ip1<r2 + [γ + (1− γ)[1− F2(p1)]]Ip1=r2 + [1− F2(p1)]Ip1>r2}
+ (1− σ − λ){[1− F2(r1) + (1− γ) Pr(p2 = r1)]Ip1<r1
+ [1− F2(r1)]Ip1=r1 + [1− F2(p1)]Ip1>r1} }
(3.15)
As firm 1 raises p1 along H, its expected profit is increasing since F2(p1) is
constant along H (and equal to F2(r1) if r1 ∈ H). If r2 /∈ H, then firm 1 could
increase profits by shifting all mass in H slightly below pu (or to pu if firm 2 doesn’t
have an atom there), a contradiction. If r2 ∈ H, then firm 1 can increase profits
by shifting all mass in (pd, r2) to slightly below r2, and all mass in (r2, p
u) either to
slightly below r2 or to p
u, again contradicting the equilibrium. A similar argument
applies when firm 1 has no support over H, but firm 2 does. This tells us that any
breaks in S1 ∩ S2 are mutual.
Now suppose that neither firm randomizes over H in equilibrium. Suppose first
that pd 6= r1, pd 6= r2 and that neither firm has an atom at pd. Then either firm
1 has a strictly higher expected profit at pu (or slightly below r2 if r2 ∈ H) than
at pd, or firm 2 has a strictly higher expected profit at pu (or slightly below r1 if
r1 ∈ H) than at pd, or both, if neither firm has an atom at pu, contradicting the
equilibrium.
Suppose that firm i has an atom at pd 6= rj. Since there are no mutual atoms,
firm i could increase profits by shifting its atom to pu (or slightly below pu if firm
j has an atom there, or slightly below rj if rj ∈ H).
If pd = rj 6= ri and firm i has no atom at pd, firm j’s expected profit will
be strictly higher at pu (or slightly below pu if firm i has an atom there, or to
slightly below ri if ri ∈ H) than at pd. But if firm i does have an atom at pd,
then it is possible that profits are the same at pd and pu for each firm. If γ 6= 1,
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firm i can profitably deviate by shifting its atom slightly below pd. In doing so,
it retains 1 − γ non-shoppers who search after observing a price rj and have a
positive probability of purchasing from firm j. However, if γ = 1, neither firm has
a profitable deviation. This may also be the case if, pd = r2 = r1.
By Claim 3.1, we know that both S1 and S2 have the same lower bound p,
so S1∆S2 ∈ (min{p¯1, p¯2},max{p¯1, p¯2}]. Suppose, without loss of generality, that
p¯1 > p¯2. At p1 ∈ (p¯2, p¯1], firm 1’s expected profit is p1λ(Ip1<r2 +γIp1=r2). If p¯1 > r2,
then firm 1 can increase profits by shifting mass in (r2, p¯1] to r2 or slightly below
it if γ = 0. If r2 ≥ p¯1, then profits are strictly increasing in p1 ∈ (p¯2, p¯1), so firm
1 could increase profits by shifting mass in (p¯2, p¯1] to min{r2, v} − ε for ε > 0
sufficiently small. As a result, S1∆S2 = {min{v, r2}}. If firm 2 has no atom at
p¯2, firm 1’s expected profit at p¯1 is p¯1λ, strictly higher than its expected profit of
p¯2λ at p¯2, a contradiction. If firm 2 has an atom at p¯2 6= r1, since there are no
mutual atoms, firm 2 can profitably shift the atom to slightly below p¯1 (or slightly
below r1 if r1 ∈ (p¯2, p¯1]). However, if γ = 1 and firm 2 has an atom at p¯2 = r1,
EΠ1(p¯1, F2(p¯1)) = EΠ1(p¯2, F2(p¯2)), and F1(r1) is large enough, then neither firm
has a profitable deviation. A similar argument applies when p¯2 > p¯1.
Corollary 3.3. The equilibrium supports are the same except if p¯i = rj < p¯j =
min{ri, v}.
Claim 3.4. Firm i does not have an atom in the lower bound or the interior of
firm j’s equilibrium support, except possibly at rj.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that firm 2 has an atom at p ∈ S1\{p¯1},
and suppose that p 6= r1. Firm 1’s expected profit at p− ε when firm 2 charges p
is given by Expression (3.14), whereas its expected profit at p+ ε is
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(p+ ε)λ(Ip+ε<r2 + γIp+ε=r2) (3.16)
Expression (3.16) is smaller than Expression (3.14) for
ε <
p {σ+λ[(1−γ)Ip+ε=r2+Ip+ε>r2 ]+(1−σ−λ)[(1−γ)Ip=r1+Ip>r1 ]}
σ+λ[1+Ip+ε<r2+γIp+ε=r2 ]+(1−σ−λ)[(1−γ)Ip=r1+Ip>r1 ]
.
Firm 1 can increase expected profits by shifting mass from (p2 − ε, p2 + ε] to
p2− ε for the following reason. For any price that firm 2 charges, shifting mass to
p− ε never reduces the number of sales for firm 1, so it loses at most 2ε. However,
when p is charged with positive probability, lowering the price by 2ε or less will,
with positive probability, lead to a gain, and with complementary probability, at
worst, lead to a loss of 2ε. Therefore, by shifting its mass between p and p+ ε to
p−ε for sufficiently small ε, firm 1 increases its expected profit, a contradiction.
Claim 3.5. If p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ then either
(i) p¯ = min{v, r1, r2}, the supports have no breaks, and at most one firm can
have an atom at p¯, or
(ii) p¯ = min{v,max{r1, r2}}, there is a mutual break above min{r1, r2} < p¯, firm
i has an atom at rj, and firm j has an atom at p¯.
Proof. Suppose that p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ and neither firm has an atom at p¯. From Claims
3.1 and 3.4 we know that p < p¯ ≤ v. Suppose p¯ < min{v, r2}. At p¯, firm 1 expects
profit of p¯λ. For λ 6= 0, by raising its price to min{v, r2}−ε, firm 1 expects to gain
[min{v, r2} − ε− p¯]λ > 0 for sufficiently small ε > 0, a contradiction. Suppose
instead p¯ > min{v, r2}. But then at p¯ firm 1 expects no profit, a contradiction,
so p¯ = min{v, r2}. If λ = 0, firm 1 expects no profit at p¯ unless either p¯1 < p¯2 or
firm 2 has an atom at p¯, a contradiction. By a similar argument, p¯ = min{v, r1},
so p¯ = min{v, r1, r2}.
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From Claim 3.2, we know that at most one firm can have an atom at p¯, say firm
j. If γ = 1 or v < ri, then following the argument in the paragraph above, p¯ =
min{v, ri}. Otherwise, firm j cannot have an atom at p¯ (using similar reasoning
to that in the proof of Claim 3.3). Moreover, if rj ≥ ri, then p¯ = min{v, r1, r2}
and from Claim 3.3, we know that the firm supports have no breaks. Conversely,
suppose rj < ri (and therefore rj < v). Without loss of generality, let i = 1. From
Claim 3.4 we know that firm 2 cannot have an atom at r2. At r2, firm 1 expects
profit of
r2{[σ + λ(1− γ)][1− F2(r2)] + λγ} (3.17)
At p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), firm 1 expects profit of
p1(σ + λ)[1− F2(p1)] (3.18)
But since p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), by definition, 0 < F2(r2) ≤ F2(p1), so for a small enough p1,
Expression (3.17) will be strictly greater than Expression (3.18) as long as γ > 0.
Therefore, r2 must be the lower bound for a break in S1, so we must be in case
(iii) of Claim 3.3. The second to last paragraph in the proof of Claim 3.3 implies
that this equilibrium only exists for γ = 1.
Notice that Claim 3.5 rules out case (ii) in Claim 3.3.
3.6.2 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3.2 (uniqueness)
Proposition 3.2. There exists a unique Sequential Equilibrium where both firms
have supports
[
p, p¯
]
, where p¯ = min{v, r∗2} and p = λλ+σ p¯, and r∗1 and r∗2 are the
equilibrium reservation prices for non-shoppers local to firm 2 and firm 1 respec-
tively. r∗1 =∞,
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r∗2 =
 ρ2(σ, λ, c) = c
[
1− λ
σ
ln
(
σ+λ
λ
)]−1
if ρ2(σ, λ, c) ≤ v
∞ otherwise
Firm 1 distributes prices according to
F1(p) =

1−λ
σ
[
1− p/p] p ≤ p < p¯
1 p = p¯
with Pr [p1 = p¯] =
2λ+σ−1
σ+λ
, and firm 2 distributes prices according to F2(p) =
σ+λ
σ
[
1− p/p].
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 3.2, we know that F1 and F2 are the only
possible equilibrium distributions when the equilibrium support set is represented
by type (1) or (2) outlined in the body of the paper. It remains to show that
there do not exist any probability distribution functions F1 and F2 that satisfy
the conditions necessary for equilibrium with supports of type (3) or (4). We will
sketch the proof for support type (4) when λ > (1 − σ)/2. For a complete proof,
contact the authors.
F1(p) and F2(p) are represented by Equation (3.6) and Equation (3.5) re-
spectively over
[
p, p¯1 = r
∗
2
)
. Note that, λ > (1 − σ)/2 ⇔ F1(p) < F2(p), so
p¯1 = r
∗
2 < p¯2 = min{v, r∗1}. A complete solution to this equilibrium requires the
following set of equations to hold.
EΠ1(p) = EΠ1(p1, F2(p1))
⇔ (σ + λ)p = {σ[1− F2(p1)] + λ}p1
(3.19)
EΠ1(p) = EΠ1(r∗2, F2(r∗2))
⇔ (σ + λ)p = [σ Pr(p2 = p¯2) + λ]r∗2
(3.20)
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EΠ2(p) = EΠ2(p2, F1(p2))
⇔ (1− λ)p = {σ[1− F1(p2)] + (1− σ − λ)}p2
(3.21)
EΠ2(p) = EΠ2(p¯2)
⇔ (1− λ)p = (1− σ − λ)p¯2
(3.22)
∫ ρ2
p
F1(p)dp+ (ρ1 − ρ2) = c (3.23)
∫ ρ2
p
F2(p)dp = c (3.24)
EΠ1(r∗2, F2(r∗2)) > EΠ1(p¯2 − ε, F2(p¯2 − ε)) ∀ε ∈ (0, p¯2 − r∗2)
⇔ [σ Pr(p2 = p¯2) + λ]r∗2 ≥ p¯2 Pr(p2 = p¯2)(σ + λ)
(3.25)
Pr(p1 = p¯
∗
1) = 1− lim
ε→0−
F1(p¯1 − ε) ∈ (0, 1) (3.26)
Pr(p2 = p¯2) = 1− lim
ε→0−
F2(p¯2 − ε) ∈ (0, 1) (3.27)
We use the following procedure to attempt to find an equilibrium. First, we use
Equation (3.19) and Equation (3.21) to solve for F2(p) and F1(p) respectively, in
terms of p. Plugging F2(p) into Equation (3.24) and using Equation (3.20) to solve
for p we obtain ρ2 in terms of Pr(p2 = p¯2). Plugging F1(p) into Equation (3.26)
yields Pr(p1 = p¯1) in terms of Pr(p2 = p¯2). Rewriting F1(p) in terms of Pr(p2 = p¯2)
and plugging into Equation (3.23) yields ρ1 in terms of Pr(p2 = p¯2). Finally, using
Equation (3.22) to solve for p and setting this equal to the solution obtained from
Equation (3.20) we can rewrite r1 as an alternate function of Pr(p2 = p¯2). Setting
the two expressions for ρ1 equal to each other, we can now solve for Pr(p2 = p¯2) in
terms of the exogenous parameters. We can then use this to see if Inequality (3.25)
holds. The solution to Pr(p2 = p¯2) is an implicit function. A numerical analysis
86
shows us that there is no solution in the interval [0, 1] (except when λ = (1−σ)/2
and Pr(p2 = p¯2)=Pr(p1 = p¯1) = 0).
Corollary 3.2. For λ ≥ 1−σ
2
, ρ2(σ, λ, c) is decreasing in σ and increasing in λ.
Proof.
∂ρ2
∂λ
= −c(ln
λ
σ+λ
+ σ
σ+λ
)
σ(1 + λ
σ
ln λ
σ+λ
)
> 0
Similarly,
∂ρ2
∂σ
= −c[λ
′ − λ(1+λ
′
)
σ+λ
− (λ′ − λ
σ
) ln σ+λ
λ
]
σ(1− λ
σ
ln σ+λ
λ
)2
< 0
Where λ
′
is defined as in Proposition 3.4.
3.6.3 Appendix C: Proofs of Propositions 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5
Proposition 3.3. For σ ∈ (0, 1),
(i) As λ increases over [1−σ
2
, 1 − σ], the probability that firm 1 runs a sale de-
creases. Even when λ = 1− σ, price dispersion persists.
(ii) Let 1−σ
2
< λ < λ¯ < 1 − σ. Then for both firms, the price distribution
contitional on λ¯ first order stochastically dominates the price distribution
conditional on λ.
Proof.
Part (i):
∂ Pr(p1 = p¯)
∂λ
=
∂
(
2λ+σ−1
σ+λ
)
∂λ
=
1 + σ
(σ + λ)2
> 0
Moreover, if λ = 1− σ, then Pr(p1 = p¯) = 1− σ > 0.
Part (ii):
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For F1: if v < ρ2,
∂F1(p)
∂λ
= − 1
σ
{[
1− λ
(σ + λ)
v
p
]
+
(1− λ)σ
(σ + λ)2
v
p
}
If v ≥ ρ2,
∂F1(p)
∂λ
= − 1
σ
{[
1− λ
(σ + λ)
ρ2
p
]
+
1− λ
σ + λ
[
σ
(σ + λ)
ρ2
p
+
λ
p
∂ρ2
∂λ
]}
The second term inside the curly brackets in each of the two equations above
is clearly positive. Given that p¯/p = (σ + λ)/λ, the first term is minimized at p
and equal to zero there.
For F2: if v < ρ2,
∂F2(p)
∂λ
= − 1
σ
(
1− v
p
)
≤ 0
If v ≥ ρ2,
∂F2(p)
∂λ
= − 1
σ
(
1− ρ2
p
− λ
p
∂ρ2
∂λ
)
≤ 0
Proposition 3.4. The probability that firm 1 runs a sale and both firm price
distributions depend on σ and the size of dϕ(σ)/dσ = λ
′
as follows.
(i) For λ
′
sufficiently close to zero, the atom increases in σ, and firm 1’s price
distribution increases in σ for lower prices, and decreases in σ for higher
prices.
(ii) For λ
′
sufficiently close to −1, the atom decreases in σ, and firm 1’s price
distribution for a lower value of σ first order stochastically dominates that
for a higher value of σ.
(iii) Firm 2’s price distribution for a lower value of σ first order stochastically
dominates that for a higher value of σ always.
Proof. Let dϕ(σ)/dσ = λ
′
.
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d Pr(p1 = p¯)
dσ
=
d
(
2λ+σ−1
σ+λ
)
dσ
=
λ
′
(1− σ) + (1− λ)
(σ + λ)2
Since this is a strictly increasing function of λ
′
and is positive when λ
′
= 0 but
negative when λ
′
= −1, d Pr(p1 = p¯)/dσ is non-monotonic in σ.
For F1: if v < ρ2,
∂F1(p)
∂σ
= − 1
σ
(
λ
′
+
1− λ
σ
)[
1− λ
(σ + λ)
v
p
]
− 1− λ
σ(σ + λ)
v
p
[
λ
′ − λ(1 + λ
′
)
σ + λ
]
If v ≥ ρ2,
∂F1(p)
∂σ
= − 1
σ
(
λ
′
+
1− λ
σ
)[
1− λ
(σ + λ)
ρ2
p
]
− (1− λ)
σ(σ + λ)
{[
λ
′ − λ(1 + λ
′
)
σ + λ
]
ρ2
p
+
λ
p
∂ρ2
∂σ
}
When λ
′
= −1, both of these expressions are positive. Likewise, when λ′ = 0, for
p sufficiently low. However, when p is sufficiently high, both of these expressions
become negative.
For F2: if v < ρ2,
∂F2(p)
∂σ
=
λ
′
σ − λ
σ
[
1
σ
(
1− v
p
λ
σ + λ
)
− 1
p
1
σ + λ
]
> 0
If v ≥ ρ2,
∂F2(p)
∂σ
=
1
σ
[(
λ
′ − λ
σ
)(
1− ρ2
p
b
σ + λ
)
− 1
p
(
λ
′
σ − λ
σ + λ
+ λ
∂ρ2
∂σ
)]
> 0
Proposition 3.5.
(i) When σ = 1, the unique equilibrium is p1 = p2 = 0.
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(ii) When σ = 0 and λ ∈ [0.5, 1), the unique equilibrium is p1 = p2 = v, r∗1 =
r∗2 =∞, and consumers purchase from their local firm.
(iii) When σ = 0 and λ = 1, the set of pure strategy equilibria can be characterized
as follows: p1 ∈ [0, v]. If p1 ∈ [0, v), p2 = p1 − c, r∗2 = p1 = p2 + c < v. If
p1 = v, p2 ∈ [v − c,∞), and r∗2 = min{v,∞}.
Proof.
Case (i) follows from the standard Bertrand argument.
Case (ii): Claim 3.1 of Proposition 3.1 still holds, so the lower bound for both
firms has to be the same. However, from Equation 3.4, we know that the firm
distributions must be degenerate. So it must be the case that p1 = p2 = p.
Suppose p = v. Given consumer (correct) beliefs, ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ = c+ v > v, so the
reservation price is r∗ =∞, which implies that consumers never search. Consider
any other price p < v. Then ρ = c + p and both firms can profitably deviate to
min{v, p+ c}.
Case (iii): We restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria (see footnote 5). Con-
sider the strategies p1 ∈ [0, v) and p2 = p1 − c. Given consumer (correct) beliefs,
ρ∗2 = p1 = p2 + c < v, so r
∗
2 = ρ2. Following the same reasoning as in Corollary
3.1, γ must equal to 1, so consumers never search in equilibrium. Consider any
p2 > p1 − c. Then p1 < ρ2 = p2 + c and firm 1 can profitably deviate to p2 + c.
Now suppose that p2 < p1 − c. But then p1 > ρ2 so all consumers leave firm 1
and never come back. Thus, firm 1 can profitably deviate to p2 + c. Finally, when
p1 = v, firm 2 may charge any price p2 > p1− c. Given consumer (correct) beliefs,
r∗2 = min{v,∞} so firm 1 has no incentive to deviate.
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Chapter 4
The Bunny or the Battery:
Advertising to Publicize the
Brand or the Good
4.1 Introduction
According to Advertising Age’s annual assessment of advertising, total spending
on advertising in the United States in 2009 was approximately 250 billion, almost
two percent of GDP. Much of this expenditure corresponds to firms’ investment in
advertising.1 The economics literature focuses on three functions of firm advertis-
ing: altering consumer preferences (Braithwaite, 1928; Kaldor, 1950), increasing
consumer information about firms and their goods (Stigler, 1961; Telser, 1964;
Butters, 1977; Grossman and Shapiro, 1984; Robert and Stahl, 1993), and aug-
menting the utility of consuming a particular good (Stigler and Becker, 1977;
1Ad Spending by Medium and Sector. The 2011 Entertainment, Media and Advertising Market
Research Handbook, 225-227.
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Becker and Murphy, 1993).2 Marketing studies of advertising suggest that another
important goal of advertising is to publicize – to get noticed and remembered by
consumers (Miller and Berry, 1998; Bullmore, 1999; Ehrenberg et al., 2002; Till
and Baack, 2005). For example, many commercials seek to amuse at the potential
expense of lost message content (Weinberger and Gulas, 1992; Weinberger et al.,
1995; Krishnan and Chakravarti, 2003; Cline and Kellaris, 2007; Hansen et al.,
2009). Moreover, in many advertising situations (e.g., outdoor ads, magazine ads,
product placements, etc.), the exposure to an ad may be so ephemeral that it is
difficult to convey much beyond publicizing a product or a brand (Taylor et al.,
2006; van Meurs and Aristoff, 2009; Pieters and Wedel, 2004; Karniouchina, 2011).
In this paper, we seek to establish a theoretical model of advertising as a form of
publicity and to determine its effects on economic outcomes.
Since most modern advertising occurs in the midst of multi firm competition,
if we are to think of advertisements as a means to reinforce a product or brand in
consumer memory, it is important to consider the effects of rival ads on memory as
it pertains to purchasing decisions. Experimental evidence suggests that in the face
of myriad ads from different firms (Kent, 1993; Kent and Allen, 1993), consumers
are likely to get confused about which brand a particular ad refers to. This occurs
because there is typically a lag between consumers’ exposure to advertising and
their decision to purchase the advertised good (Keller, 1987) and is accentuated
when consumers review similar ads with a focus on the entertainment value of
each ad rather than with an intention of purchasing what is advertised (Burke and
Srull, 1988) and when consumers view ads for unfamiliar brands (Kent and Allen,
1994; Kumar and Krishnan, 2004). In a particularly well known instance of brand
2See Bagwell (2007) for an extensive overview of advertising.
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confusion, viewers of the Energizer Bunny ad mistook it for promoting Duracell
batteries (Lipman, 1990). Thus, a consumer may observe an ad by Seller A and
be induced to purchase from Seller B. Another instance when this occurs is when
the innovator firm which introduces a new product becomes eponymous for the
product itself. For instance, for years, purchasers of photocopy machines referred
to them as Xeroxes regardless of the brand. Therefore, advertising can function
as a public good. This quality is not necessarily bad for firms as long as brand
confusion is not unidirectional and all ads still function to expand the market for
the advertised good.
However, firms can develop advertising strategies that are better “branded”
(Unnava and Burnkrant, 1991; Law, 2002; Till and Baack, 2005). To understand
the effects of successful brand advertising, we first consider how consumers in the
market decide which brand to buy. Building on research in psychology, experimen-
tal studies of consumers posit that once the consumer decides to buy the product,
he considers his list of viable brand alternatives, referred to as his consideration
set (Miller and Berry, 1998; and Romaniuk and Sharp, 2004). After evoking a
certain number of brands in his consideration set, he evaluates other attributes
such as price, and then makes his decision of which brand to buy. Bullmore (1999)
succinctly summarizes this decision process: “Most of us have clusters of brands
which we find perfectly satisfactory. We will allocate share of choice within this
repertoire according to chance, promotions, advertising, availability, price, impulse
or recommendation. Brands may move in or out of that repertoire, but only in-
frequently.” For example, a consumer shopping for toothpaste at the supermarket
has an idea of which brands he is willing to buy even before stepping into the tooth-
paste aisle. He then compares the prices of the first couple of brands that come
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into his mind and buys the cheapest. Alternatively, a consumer who is considering
buying a car chooses to visit a subset of local car dealerships. After looking at the
different makes, he purchases the one with the best gas mileage. As such, firms
find it crucial to be on top of consumers’ minds. By promoting the brand, firms
attempt to achieve a prominent position in the consumer consideration set.
We have identified two qualities of advertising publicity: a public good quality
and a branding quality. We define the public good quality as ad breadth. Ads
with greater breadth capture consumers’ attention in such a way that they are
more likely to enter the market, but they do not assure a firm that convinces an
additional consumer to enter the market that the consumer will make a purchase
from that firm. To paraphrase, in our paper, an ad with greater breadth directly
enhances promotion of a good, but only indirectly benefits the individual brand.
On the other hand, the branding quality, which we refer to as brand salience,
increases the probability that when a consumer goes to make a purchase, he will
evoke that brand out of his consideration set.
This paper sets up two theoretical models of advertising as a form of publicity,
one to investigate the effects of ad breadth and another to analyze the effects of
brand salience on economic outcomes. We find that in equilibrium, the level of ad
breadth does not depend on price. Intuitively, this occurs because while greater
breadth increases the number of consumers purchasing a product, it does not
improve a firm’s chances of making a sale to any particular consumer. Therefore,
firms continue to compete on price with the same intensity regardless of the number
of consumers.
The relationship between brand salience and price is substantially more com-
plicated. If salient advertising is either sufficiently expensive or sufficiently cheap,
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all firms either forego or engage in advertising, respectively. In both cases, the
equilibrium price distributions are identical and both firms have an equal prob-
ability of being evoked. This means that profit is strictly lower in the low cost
case, making advertising wasteful. The effect of salient advertising is lost because
both firms advertise with equal intensity. Intermediate levels of advertising cost
lead to a mixed strategy equilibrium in advertising. Expected prices are higher
in this equilibrium because, unlike in the pure strategy cases, where advertising is
ineffective, firms can successfully use advertising to get consumers to pay attention
to their brand, dampening the effectiveness of having a lower price.
Price dispersion is a consequence of our setup because firms know that some
consumers who have evoked them will also evoke rival brands, and they wish to
remain competitive over such consumers. As in Burdett and Judd’s (1983) noisy
sequential search framework, price dispersion occurs because every consumer has
a positive probability of evoking one or more firms. However, in this paper, the
distribution is endogenously determined by advertising.3 A consumer who enters
the market for a good is aware of all potential competitors in that market, but he
only compares the prices of brands he has evoked.4 In fact, as we discuss later,
our model is robust to various forms of consumer heterogeneity as long as there
exists a positive mass of consumers with a finite number of evocations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 sets up the
3This model differs from models of informative advertising with price dispersion (e.g., Butters,
1977; Robert and Stahl, 1993) where consumers cannot purchase from a particular firm without
either obtaining a price ad from that firm or having paid a cost to search that firm.
4This contrasts both Chioveanu’s (2008) model of persuasive advertising, where all consumers
choose the lowest priced good unless they are “convinced” by advertising to become loyal to a
certain brand and the framework of Haan and Moraga-Gonzlez (2009) where consumers are more
likely to search firms with more salient advertising, but where search is required before a firm is
considered.
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model of breadth and analyzes its equilibrium and comparative statics. Section
4.3 does the same for salience. Section 4.4 discusses and Section 4.5 concludes.
Section 4.6 contains supplementary formal proofs.
4.2 Model of Breadth
There are n ≥ 2 identical firms that compete to sell a homogeneous good. Each
firm pays a constant marginal cost of c to produce the good. Firm imakes a twofold
decision: it sets its price, pi and determines its level of ad breadth, a
b
i ∈ R+. For the
remainder of the section, we treat the words breadth and advertising synonymously.
The cost of advertising is given by A(abi), which is increasing and strictly convex.
We assume there is no cost of no advertising: A(0) = 0.
On the other side of the market, there is a mass of identical consumers with
valuation v > c for the good. Consumers cannot purchase the product without
remembering an ad from at least one firm. We can think of ads in this model
as reminding consumers that they want the product being advertised, or, in the
extreme case, as informing them that it exists. A consumer who remembers an ad
enters the market and evokes one or two firms from his consideration set (which,
for simplicity, is the set of all firms). Note that ads are remembered while firms are
evoked. If only one firm is evoked, the consumer purchases from that firm. If two
different firms are evoked, the consumer chooses the firm offering the lowest price.
If both firms have the same price, each of these firms has an equal probability of
being chosen.
The number of consumers who remember at least one ad is given by r(
∑n
i=1 a
b
i),
which is increasing and strictly concave in abi for all i. There is no market for the
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good when no firm advertises: r(0) = 0. The probability that a consumer evokes
firm i from his consideration set is σi. Consumers make two evocations with
replacement (thus, the probability that a consumer evokes the same firm i twice
is σ2i ). In this framework, advertising increases the number of consumers in the
market, r(
∑n
i=1 a
b
i), but does not help any individual firm distinguish itself from
its rivals.
Firms and consumers play the following game. First, the n firms in the market
simultaneously choose prices and the level of advertising. Then, consumers in the
market observe the prices of the firms they evoke and make a purchase decision.
A pricing strategy for firm i is a price distribution Fi, where Fi(p) denotes the
probability that firm i offers a price smaller than or equal to p. An advertising
strategy for firm i is a correspondence abi defined over the support of Fi, where
abi(p) denotes the level(s) of ad breadth at price p.
4.2.1 Equilibrium Analysis
We restrict attention to the symmetric equilibrium, where σi =
1
n
, abi = a
b and
prices are distributed according to Fi(pi) = F (p) over some interval [p, p¯] for all
i. At each price p ∈ [p, p¯], the optimal level of advertising is unique. This follows
directly by strict concavity of r and strict convexity of A. Therefore, in equilibrium,
ab is a surjective function of p. Before we derive the equilibrium of this game, we
make two restrictions on the equilibrium support.
Claim 4.1. There are no atoms in the equilibrium price distribution.
Claim 4.2. The upper bound of the equilibrium firm price distribution is v.
Claim 4.1 follows by a standard atom undercutting argument. Claim 4.2 follows
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because firms make no profits at prices above v, but they always have an incentive
to raise prices to v for consumers who have evoked them and no other firms. Both
proofs are in the appendix.
Since there are no atoms in equilibrium, the profit equation at each price p in
the support of F is
EΠi
(
p, ab(p)
)
=
v∫
p
. . .
v∫
p
r
(
ab(p) + (n− 1)ab(xj)
) ∏
j 6=i
dF (xi)
∗
{(
1
n
)2
+ 2
n
(
1− 1
n
)
[1− F (p)]
}
(p− c)− A (ab(p)) (4.1)
From the first order condition for maximization with respect to ab, we have{(
1
n
)2
+ 2
n
(
1− 1
n
)
[1− F (p)]
}
(p− c)
= A′(ab(p))[
v∫
p
. . .
v∫
p
r′
(
ab(p) + (n− 1)abj(xj)
) ∏
j 6=i
dF (xi)]
−1 (4.2)
Substituting (4.2) into (4.1), we get
EΠi =
v∫
p
. . .
v∫
p
r
(
ab(p) + (n− 1)abj(xj)
) ∏
j 6=i
dF (xi)
∗ A
′(ab(p))
v∫
p
. . .
v∫
p
r′
(
ab(p) + (n− 1)abj(xi)
) ∏
j 6=i
dF (xi)
− A (ab(p)) (4.3)
Equation (4.3) tells us that, in equilibrium, breadth does not depend on price.
Therefore we can solve for the equilibrium price distribution by setting expected
profit at v equal to expected profit for an arbitrary p in the support, keeping ab
constant. This gives us
F (p) = 1− v − p
2(n− 1)(p− c) (4.4)
The lower bound of the equilibrium price distribution is
p =
v − c
2n− 1 + c (4.5)
Setting the right hand side of Expression (4.3) to Expression (4.1) evaluated at p,
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we obtain the optimal level of breadth
ab
∗
= Ψ−1
(
v − c
n2
)
(4.6)
where Ψ
(
ab
∗)
= A
′(ab
∗
)
r′(nab∗)
.
Claim 4.3 summarizes the above derivation of equilibrium.
Claim 4.3. There exists a unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium where both firms
distribute prices according to F (p) = (2n−1)(p−c)−(v−c)
2(n−1)(p−c) over support [
v−c
2n−1 + c, v] and
the equilibrium level of breadth ab
∗
= Ψ−1
(
v−c
n2
)
is independent of price.
It is now easy to see that breadth increases in consumers’ valuation for the
good and decreases in the number of firms and in firms’ cost of production.
Distributions with higher consumer valuation or marginal cost of production
first order stochastically dominate those with lower consumer valuation and marginal
cost of production. On the contrary, equilibrium price distributions with a larger
number of firms are first order stochastically dominated by those with a smaller
number of firms. Likewise, higher consumer valuation and marginal cost of produc-
tion increase the lower bound of the firm price distribution, and a larger number
of firms decreases it.
4.3 Model of Salience
There are 2 identical firms that compete to sell a homogeneous good. Each firm
pays a constant marginal cost of c to produce the good. Firm i makes a twofold
decision: it sets price, pi, and determines whether to engage in salient advertising
(asi = 1) or not (a
s
i = 0). If it chooses to engage in salient advertising, it incurs a
cost of A > 0.
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On the other side of the market, there is a unit mass of identical consumers
with valuation v > c for the good. Unlike in the previous model, any consumers
can readily purchase the product at the outset of the game from either firm that
he evokes – the two firms comprise consumers’ consideration sets. Instead, ads
influence the probability that an individual consumer evokes a particular firm from
his consideration set. Thus, in this model, ads can make a brand more salient to
a consumer.
The probability that a consumer evokes firm i from his consideration set is
given by σi
(
asi , a
s
j
)
. In particular, if as1 = a
s
2, then σ1 = σ2 =
1
2
. If asi > a
s
j , then
σi = α and σj = 1−α, α ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
. As in the previous model, consumers make two
evocations with replacement. If only one firm is evoked, the consumer purchases
from that firm. If two different firms are evoked, the consumer chooses the firm
offering the lower price. If both firms have the same price, each of them has an
equal probability of being chosen. In this framework, salient advertising raises the
probability that a firm i will be evoked, but does not expand the market.
Firms and consumers play a game similar to that in the previous model. First,
the 2 firms in the market simultaneously choose prices and decide whether or not
to engage in salient advertising. Then, consumers in the market observe the prices
of the firms they evoke and make a purchase decision. A pricing strategy for firm
i is a price distribution Fi. A pure advertising strategy is a mapping from the
support of Fi, to the binary variable a
s
i ∈ {0, 1}. A mixed advertising strategy can
then be denoted by a probability, β that asi = 1, where β(p) is the probability that
a firm advertises at price p.
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4.3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
We restrict attention to the symmetric equilibrium and dispense with subscripts
on F . The characterization of equilibrium depends on the cost to maximum ben-
efit ratio of advertising, A/(v − c). Firms always play mixed pricing strategies.
However, when the cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising is sufficiently
high or sufficiently low, both firms either forego advertising or always advertise,
respectively. On the other hand, intermediate values of this ratio can lead to mixed
strategy equilibria in advertising where firms are either always indifferent between
advertising and not advertising, or they are indifferent for low(high) prices in the
support of F , but prefer to advertise(not advertise) for high(low) prices. Therefore,
we divide the equilibrium analysis into five cases in which the cost to maximum
benefit ratio of advertising is: high, low, medium, medium-high, and medium-low.
As in the previous section, the equilibrium price distribution has no atoms,
and its upper bound is the consumer valuation v. The proofs follow similarly. As
a result, expected profit when firm i does not invest in salient advertising is:
EΠi(p, 0) =
{
1
4
+ 1
2
[1− F (p)]} (1− Eβ)(p− c)
+ {(1− α)2 + 2α(1− α)[1− F (p)]}Eβ(p− c)
(4.7)
where Eβ =
v∫
p
β(x)dF (x). Likewise, expected profit when it invests in salience is:
EΠi(p, 1) = {α2 + 2α(1− α)[1− F (p)]} (1− Eβ)(p− c)
+
{
1
4
+ 1
2
[1− F (p)]}Eβ(p− c)− A (4.8)
Case 1: High cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising
We say that the cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising is high whenever
A/(v− c) ≥ α2− 1
4
. In the unique equilibrium of this case, firms do not engage in
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salient advertising. Prices are distributed according to:
F (p) = 1− v − p
2(p− c) (4.9)
Equilibrium price distributions with higher consumer valuation and marginal
cost of production first order stochastically dominate those with lower consumer
valuation and marginal production cost, respectively.
The lower bound of the equilibrium price distribution is increasing in both
consumer valuation and marginal cost of production. It is given by
p =
v + 2c
3
(4.10)
Expected firm profit is positive and equal to
EΠ =
v − c
4
(4.11)
Case 2: Low cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising
We say that the cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising is low whenever
A/(v − c) ≤ 1
3
(α2 − 1
4
). In the unique equilibrium of this case, both firms engage
in salient advertising. The equilibrium firm price distribution and lower bound
are the same as the those in Equation (4.9) and Equation (4.10). However, firm
expected profit is strictly smaller than that in Equation (4.11) since firms have to
incur the cost A.
In this case, firms end up in a prisoner’s dilemma where advertising is effectively
wasted. It is not worthwhile for firm i to deviate to no advertisement because when
doing so there is an overly large probability that consumers will only evoke the
rival firm, but when advertising, it finds itself competing on price just as heavily
as if neither firm was to advertise.
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Case 3: Medium cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising
In this case, A/(v − c) ∈ [1
4
− (1 − α)2, α − 1
2
). The unique equilibrium involves
firms engaging in salient advertising with positive probability at every price in the
support of F . This means that the expected probability that a firm is advertising,
Eβ, is a number between zero and one. Setting Equation (4.7) equal to Equation
(4.8) at v, we can solve for Eβ to get
Eβ =
(
α− 1
2
) (
α + 1
2
)− A
v−c
2
(
α− 1
2
)2 (4.12)
Since Eβ is an expectation over price, it should be the same for every price in
the support of F . Therefore, to find the equilibrium firm price distribution we set
Equation (4.7) equal to Equation (4.8) at an arbitrary price in the support of F
after substituting Eβ from Equation (4.12). This yields
F (p) = 1−
A
p−c − Av−c
2
(
α− 1
2
− A
v−c
) (4.13)
The lower bound of the support is
p =
A
2
(
α− 1
2
)− A
v−c
+ c (4.14)
Observe that the lower bound of the distribution in this case is higher than
the lower bound of the equilibrium price distribution in the high and low cost
to maximum benefit ratio of advertising cases. In fact, the entire distribution in
this case first order stochastically dominates the two former cases. Unlike in the
case with a low cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising, firms can effectively
compete on advertising and might prefer to do so in place of setting a low price.
However, competition in advertising is relatively unprofitable. Expected firm profit
is
EΠ = (v − c) [1
4
(1− Eβ) + (1− α)2 Eβ] (4.15)
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Since (1 − α)2 < 1
4
, it can be readily seen that expected profit in Equation
(4.15) is smaller than when the cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising is
high. Moreover, expected profit here may be larger or smaller than that in the low
cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising depending on the size of A in each
of these cases. The problem for firms is that while advertising is effective relative
to the low cost to maximum benefit ratio case, it is also much more expensive.
By engaging in expensive advertising with a high enough probability, firms do not
fully recoup the cost of advertising with the higher average prices that it entails.
Equilibrium price distributions with higher marginal cost of production and
higher cost of advertising first order stochastically dominate those with lower costs.
Similarly, the lower bound is increasing in both costs. Surprisingly, these results do
not hold for higher consumer valuation. To the contrary, the lower bound as well
as average price fall in consumer valuation. A higher consumer valuation lowers
the cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising, thereby raising the probability
that a firm will advertise in equilibrium (Eβ). Knowing that rival firms are more
likely to advertise in equilibrium, firms find that the marginal benefit of advertising
declines and opt to intensify their price competition.
Case 4: Medium-high cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising
In this case, A/(v − c) ∈ [α − 1
2
, α2 − 1
4
]. We conjecture that the unique equilib-
rium has no advertising at low prices. At high prices, firms randomize between
advertising and not advertising. The expected probability of advertising on the
support is given by Equation (4.12).
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Case 5: Medium-low cost to maximum benefit ratio of advertising
In this case, A/(v − c) ∈ [1
3
(α2 − 1
4
), 1
4
− (1− α)2]. We conjecture that the unique
equilibrium has advertising at high prices. At low prices, firms randomize between
advertising and not advertising. The expected probability of advertising on the
support is given by Equation (4.12).
4.4 Discussion
In both of our models, all consumers can evoke at most two firms. Increasing the
number of evocations does not alter our findings as long as the number of evoca-
tions is finite. This happens because there is always a positive probability that
only one firm gets evoked. Therefore, there is always an incentive to raise prices.
Because the probability of a single firm getting evoked goes down and because
there is a chance of more than two firms being evoked, price competition will in-
crease with the number of evocations. We should expect that price distributions
with fewer evocations first order stochastically dominate those with more.
As mentioned in the introduction, the models above are robust to various
forms of consumer heterogeneity. First, consider what happens if we introduce
consumers who are loyal to a particular firm. In our model, this is equivalent
to having consumers who only evoke that particular firm. As long as there is
a sufficient number of consumers who evoke other firms, firms will still have an
incentive to lower prices and price dispersion will persist. Alternatively, we can
introduce consumers who conduct a thorough search of all brands. We can think
of these consumers as individuals who evoke every firm in the market to get the
lowest price. As in our original framework, firms will still have incentives to charge
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high prices as long as there is a sufficient number of consumers who evoke only a
finite number of firms. The Bertrand outcome will not occur because there is a
positive probability that only one firm gets evoked by some individuals.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed advertising as a form of publicity. Publicity has
two effects for firms: it increases the size of the market and it makes brands
more salient to consumers. We separately analyze these two effects. Advertising
expands the market by informing or reminding consumers that they need a certain
product. When a particular firm’s advertising for this product is not salient, it
can send consumers of the product to a rival firm. In contrast, a firm that engages
in salient advertising can increase its chances of coming to a consumer’s mind in
a buying situation.
This paper remains a work in progress. Although the market expanding effects
of advertising have been fully characterized, we have not yet analyzed equilib-
rium when the ratio of cost to maximum benefit of advertising is medium-low or
medium-high. In addition, we intend to show that our binary model of salient
advertising is sufficient in the sense that it tells us everything that a model of
salient advertising where advertising is treated continuously might tell us. More-
over, we intend to expand this model to the n firm case. Finally, we intend to
examine various asymmetries that can occur. These include asymmetries in the
cost of production and the cost of advertising, as well as in consumer preferences
regarding different brands. In particular, consumers evoking a preferred brand, A,
and a second brand, B, may require a substantially lower price for B to induce
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them to purchase it. This can result in substantial changes in advertising by both
firms.
4.6 Appendix
Claim 4.1. There are no atoms in the equilibrium price distribution.
Proof. Suppose the equilibrium price distributions have an atom at price pˆ. Let
aˆb(pˆ) be the level of advertising at pˆ. Firm i’s expected profit at pˆ is
EΠi
(
pˆ, aˆb(pˆ)
)
=
v∫
p
. . .
v∫
p
r
(
aˆb(pˆ) + (n− 1)abj(xj)
) ∏
j 6=i
dF (xi)
∗
{(
1
n
)2
+ 2
n
(
1− 1
n
) {[1− F (pˆ)] + P[p = pˆ]}} (pˆ− c)− A (aˆb(pˆ)) (4.16)
Suppose that firm i shifts mass from pˆ to pˆ−ε, without changing breadth. Expected
profit becomes
EΠi
(
pˆ− ε, aˆb(pˆ)) = v∫
p
. . .
v∫
p
r
(
aˆb(pˆ) + (n− 1)abj(xj)
) ∏
j 6=i
dF (xi)
∗
{(
1
n
)2
+ 2
n
(
1− 1
n
)
[1− F (pˆ− ε)]
}
(pˆ− ε− c)− A (aˆb(pˆ)) (4.17)
For ε small enough, profit at pˆ−ε is strictly higher than profit at pˆ, a contradiction.
Claim 4.2. The upper bound of the equilibrium firm price distribution is v.
Proof. A firm pricing at p¯ > v makes no profit. Suppose that the upper bound
is p¯ < v. At p¯, firm i will only sell if it is evoked both times, since it will be
underpriced for sure. Thus, it can increase its profit by raising its price to v, a
contradiction.
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